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In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),' which established comprehensive federal
regulation of private employee benefit plans. ERISA amended
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, adding a number
of new requirements that must be met if an employee benefit
plan is to qualify for favorable tax treatment.' In addition,
ERISA established substantially identical substantive civil law
requirements that must be met by plans created by employers
and employee organizations that operate in interstate com-
merce.3 For purposes of this Article, the term "ERISA" is used
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
2. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title II, 88 Stat. 829, 898 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). A general discussion of the favorable tax
consequences of qualified retirement plans may be found in M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RE-
TIREMENT PLANS § 3.1 (1977).
3. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title I, 88 Stat. 829, 832 (1974) (codified as
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to refer both to the tax-qualification provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code and the substantive civil law provisions found in
Title 29 of the United States Code.
Following the enactment of ERISA, many employers adopted
various types of ERISA retirement plans that cover millions of
employees and hold hundreds of billions of dollars in assets.5
For purposes of this Article, the term "ERISA retirement plan"
refers to those employee benefit plans that provide that plan
benefits may not be "assigned or alienated,"' either because
such a provision is required as a matter of substantive law7 or as
a prerequisite to favorable tax treatment.' The term therefore
includes many types of pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus
plans, and employee annuities, established by corporations,' as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145); see also ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1982) (limit-
ing scope of substantive law provisions to entities operating in interstate commerce).
4. The tax qualification and substantive law provisions are identical in all respects
relevant to this Article, except as noted.
5. See generally Erlenborn, Was ERISA Worth the Effort?, PENSION WORLD, Sept.
1984, at 36.
6. In the absence of such a plan provision, the conflict between ERISA and the Bank-
ruptcy Code examined in this Article would not arise.
7. See ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982) ("Each pension plan shall
provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."); see
also infra note 8. Although ERISA's substantive law provisions only require "pension
plans" to include the restrictions on assignment and alienation, this term is defined
broadly enough to include stock bonus, pension or profit-sharing plans, and employee
annuities. See ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1982) (definition of "pension plan");
Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 514-16 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (profit-sharing plan is within "pension plan" definition).
8. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13)(A) (West Supp. 1985) ("A trust shall not constitute a
qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."); see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b) (1978) ("Under section 401(a)(13), a trust will not be quali-
fied unless the plan of which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the
plan may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or equitable process.").
Some courts and commentators have erroneously concluded that Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)-13(b), interpreting 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13)(A) (West Supp. 1985), is also a
binding interpretation of the substantive law assignment and alienation provision of
ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982), described supra note 7. See General
Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc.
v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 519-20 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Note, Exemption of
ERISA Benefits Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 83 MICH. L. REv.
214, 229 n.83 (1984).
The error arises from a misapplication of ERISA § 3002(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1982).
Section 3002(c) provides that Treasury regulations issued under 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 410(a),
411, 412 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985) also apply to analogous substantive law provisions in
Title I of ERISA. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b), however, is an interpretation of 26
U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985), not 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 410(a), 411 or 412 (West
1978 & Supp. 1985)). Therefore, the regulation is not a binding interpretation of ERISA
§ 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982).
9. As a matter of substantive law, the assignment or alienation restriction must be
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well as "Keogh" plans for self-employed individuals.10 The term
does not include Individual Retirement Accounts."
When an employee covered by an ERISA retirement plan files
a petition in bankruptcy, the court is presented with a number
of complex issues regarding the relationship among ERISA, the
Bankruptcy Code (Code), 2 and the state law of creditors' rights.
Three issues have emerged in these cases, and the courts have
divided on the proper resolution of each of these issues. First, is
the debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan "property of
the estate," ' and thus available for distribution to creditors?
Second, if the debtor's interest is property of the estate, and the
debtor uses the state exemption scheme, is his interest neverthe-
less exempt in bankruptcy because it is "exempt under Federal
[nonbankruptcyl law?' 4 Third, if the debtor chooses the federal
bankruptcy exemption scheme, is his interest in the retirement
plan exempt under the section exempting his "right to receive a
payment" under a retirement plan, "to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor?'"
Although this Article explores each of these issues in turn, it is
not possible to develop a logical and consistent approach to the
treatment of ERISA retirement plan benefits in bankruptcy
without considering each issue in light of the other two, and in
light of the rights of creditors in the nonbankruptcy context.
included in any plan established or maintained by an employer or employee organization
that provides "retirement income" to employees. See ERISA §§ 3(2), 206(d)(1), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1002(2), 1056(d)(1) (1982); see also supra note 7.
To qualify for favorable tax treatment, the following types of plans must include the
assignment and alienation restriction: stock bonus, pension and profit-sharing plans, tax
credit employee stock ownership plans, and employee annuities. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)
(West 1978 & Supp. 1985) (stock bonus, pension or profit-sharing plans); 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 409 (West. Supp. 1985) (tax credit employee stock ownership plans); 26 U.S.C.A.
§§ 403(a), 404(a) (West 1978 & Supp. 1985) (employee annuities).
10. The term "ERISA retirement plan" includes retirement plans established by cor-
porations and self-employed individuals. Plans for self-employed individuals are referred
to as "Keogh plans" or "H.R. 10 plans." See 26 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1982). All Keogh plans
must contain the assignment and alienation restrictions to qualify for favorable tax sta-
tus. As a matter of substantive law, however, only those Keogh plans that cover the
common law employees of the self-employed individual must restrict assignment and
alienation. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (1984).
11. ERISA regulates a number of benefit and pension plans that are not required to
include the assignment and alienation provisions. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 408(a) (Indi-
vidual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)), 408(b) (Individual Retirement Annuities (IRANs))
(West 1978 & Supp. 1985). The status of these plans in bankruptcy is not explicitly
considered in this Article, although they may in some cases be analogous to certain
ERISA retirement plans.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 151326 (1982).
13. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West. Supp. 1985); see infra Part I.
14. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); see infra Part II(A).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982); see infra Part II(B).
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I. ERISA RETIREMENT PLAN BENEFITS AS "PROPERTY OF THE
ESTATE"
The filing of a petition in bankruptcy creates an "estate,"
which is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property" as of the date of the petition. 6 Congress in-
tended that this broad definition of "property and the estate"
would encompass anything the debtor has that is of value.17 The
debtor's right to receive retirement benefits, whether contingent
or vested, is clearly a "legal or equitable interest" of the
debtor."'
An interest of the debtor becomes property of the estate "not-
withstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instru-
ment, or applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . that restricts or
conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor . . . .-19 Thus,
although ERISA requires, both as a matter of substantive law
and as a condition to qualification for favorable tax treatment,
that all ERISA retirement plans provide that the benefits may
16. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982). Whether or not a debtor has a "legal or equitable
interest" in property is governed by state nonbankruptcy law. If such an interest exists,
however, § 541(a)(1) requires that it become property of the estate. See 4 L. KING, COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.01[11, at 541-13 (15th ed. 1984).
17. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983); S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at
5787, 5868 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 989, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws]; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 176, 367-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6136, 6322-24 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS].
18. See Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees' Stock Bonus Plan and Trust (In re
DeWeese), 47 Bankr. 251, 254-55 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust
Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67, 72-73 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985). The question of whether
a debtor's interest in a retirement plan is a "legal or equitable interest" is rarely dis-
puted. Section 541(a)(1) clearly encompasses the debtor's contingent, future interests in
property. See, e.g., Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1982); Firestone v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). See
generally In re Ryerson, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 69,956 at 85,516 to 85,517 (9th Cir.
Mar. 16, 1984) ("By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its
intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent
and not subject to possession until some future time."). But see In re Sheridan, 38
Bankr. 52, 55 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983) (applying Vermont law) ("A right to future payments
that are non-transferable, non-assignable and non-attachable, is of no value to the estate,
for the reason that the entitlement may not be prematurely liquidated into a lump sum
or other current distribution."); In re Haynes, 9 Bankr. 418, 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1981)
(Navy retirement benefits) ("The right to future payment is of no value to the debtor's
estate due to the fact that the Navy will not make a lump sum distribution or any distri-
bution in advance.").
19. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985); see also S. REP. No. 989, supra
note 17, at 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5869.
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not be "assigned or alienated" by the beneficiary,20 these provi-
sions would not prevent the debtor's interest in a plan from be-
coming property of the estate.2
The Code provides one exception to the general rule that re-
strictions on the transfer of an interest by the debtor do not pre-
vent the interest from becoming property of the estate. Section
541(c)(2) states: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial in-
terest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this ti-
tle."'2 2 The conflict over ERISA retirement plans in Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 bankruptcy s has focused primarily on this sec-
tion. If the debtor's interest in an ERISA plan falls within sec-
tion 541(c)(2), the interest is excluded from the property of the
estate. In contrast, if the debtor's interest is not within section
541(c)(2), it will be included in the estate. The debtor's rights in
the retirement plan will then be distributed to the creditors, un-
less the debtor claims an exemption. 4
Courts that have considered whether ERISA retirement plans
should be included in the property of the estate have disagreed
over the interpretation of section 541(c)(2). The majority of
courts have held that Congress intended that section to apply to
only spendthrift trusts enforceable under state law.26 Therefore,
20. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
21. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(11)(A) (West Supp. 1985) expressly invalidates such restric-
tions on transfers of interest. See, e.g., Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr.
305, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Clotfelter v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434, 437 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982); cf. Regan v. Ross, 6691 F.2d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1982)
(state law prohibition against assignment of state pension benefits to creditors does not
prevent pension benefits from becoming property of estate). But cf. In re Sheridan, 38
Bankr. 52, 55 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983) (debtor's entitlement to future payments under Ver-
mont Employees' Retirement System held not property of the estate because "[a] right
to future payments that are non-transferable, non-assignable and non-attachable, is of
no value to the estate").
22. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
23. See infra Part I(C).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See generally infra note 80 and accompanying text (spendthrift trusts defined).
In the following cases, the courts applied the state law of spendthrift trusts to determine
whether the debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan was excluded under
§ 541(c)(2): Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1358-61
(9th Cir. 1985) (qualified pension and profit-sharing plan; professional corporation); Mc-
Lean v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (In re McLean),
762 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (4th Cir. 1985) (qualified pension plan; employee organization),
rev'g on other grounds, 41 Bankr. 893 (D.S.C. 1984); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re
Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985) (qualified pension plans; professional
association); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984)
(qualified profit-sharing plan; professional corporation), aff'g 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1982); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1983) (qualified Ke-
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an ERISA retirement plan will only be excluded from the prop-
erty of the estate if it is such a spendthrift trust.
For example, in Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
(In re Di Piazza),6 the Chapter 7 debtor sought to exclude from
the property of the estate his interests in his former enfployer's
pension and profit-sharing plans. The plans, which were tax-
qualified, together held over $7,000 in benefits.27 The bank-
ruptcy court, after examining the legislative history of section
541(c)(2), concluded that the section excludes from the property
of an estate only those retirement plans that are spendthrift
trusts under Illinois law.28 Because the debtor had a right to
ogh plan); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 51 Bankr. 554, 556 (N.D. Ala. 1985)
(qualified profit-sharing plan; corporation plan); Miller v. Jones (In re Jones), 43 Bankr.
1002, 1006 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (qualified pension plan; corporate plan); Miller v. Lincoln
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. (In re Cook), 43 Bankr. 996, 1000 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (qualified
savings and profit-sharing plan; corporate plan); Bakst v. Guernsey (In re Guernsey), 54
Bankr. 68, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (employee stock ownership plan; corporate plan);
Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees' Stock Bonus Plan and Trust (In re DeWeese),
47 Bankr. 251, 255 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (qualified stock bonus plan; corporate plan);
In re Elsea, 47 Bankr. 142, 147-49 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (qualified retirement plans;
corporate plans); Nachman v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 50 Bankr. 22, 23 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985)
(qualified Keogh plan); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. of Boston (In re O'Brien), 50
Bankr. 67, 74 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (qualified Keogh plan); In re Gillett, 46 Bankr. 642,
644-45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (qualified pension and profit-sharing plans; corporate
plan); In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr. 72, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (qualified Keogh pen-
sion plan; partnership plan); Nixon v. P.J. Pedone & Co. (In re Nichols), 42 Bankr. 772,
776 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (qualified profit-sharing and trust plan; corporate plan); In
re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515, 517 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (qualified savings and profit-shar-
ing fund; corporate plan); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29
Bankr. 916, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (qualified pension and profit-sharing plan; corpo-
rate plan); In re Strasma, 26 Bankr. 449, 450 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (Keogh plan); In
re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 830 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (Keogh profit-sharing
plan); In re Watson, 13 Bankr. 391, 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (qualified cooperative
investment plan); Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412, 417 n.6 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dictum) (Keogh plan).
In several other cases, the debtor had an interest in a non-qualified retirement plan,
but the plans contained restrictions on assignment and alienation that were similar to
those of ERISA plans. In these cases, the courts applied state spendthrift trust law as
the standard under § 541(c)(2). See Reagan v. Austin Mun. Fed. Credit Union, 741 F.2d
95, 97 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (municipal retirement fund); Johnson v. Fenslage (In
re Johnson), 724 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1984) (group variable annuity); American
Nat'l Bank v. Huff (In re Huff), 42 Bankr. 553, 556 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (state em-
ployees deferred compensation plan); SSA Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. Bizon, 42
Bankr. 338, 341 (D. Md. 1984) (civil service retirement benefits); In re Werner, 31 Bankr.
418, 420-21 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (teachers.retirement association fund). These cases
do not directly support the proposition that § 541(c)(2) excludes only spendthrift trusts
from the property of the estate. This is because the argument that § 541(c)(2) also ex-
cludes all ERISA plans is based on ERISA's preemption of state law, not the specific
language of any particular retirement plan. See text at infra notes 31-33; infra Part I(D).
26. 29 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
27. Id. at 917.
28. Id. at 918.
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withdraw the funds at any time, although early withdrawal
would result in the forfeiture of a portion of the benefits contrib-
uted by the employer, the court held that the plans were not
spendthrift trusts under Illinois law.2 9 As a result, the debtor's
interests in the plans were included in the property of the estate
and would be distributed to his creditors unless he could claim
an appropriate exemption. 80
A significant minority of courts has held that section 541(c)(2)
excludes from the property of the estate not only those trusts
that are enforceable against creditors under state spendthrift
trust law, but also trusts enforceable against creditors under fed-
eral nonbankruptcy law, such as ERISA. 31 In the nonbankruptcy
context, the courts have uniformly held that the general credi-
tors of an ERISA-plan participant may not reach his interest in
the plan because ERISA creates a per se federal exemption from
creditors' claims.32 Because the creditors of the debtor cannot
attach his interest in an ERISA retirement plan prior to the pe-
tition, the minority view is that this restriction is carried over
into bankruptcy by means of section 541(c)(2).11
In Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley),34 for example, the
Chapter 7 debtor attempted to exclude from the property of the
estate his interests in an employee annuity plan, a stock owner-
ship plan, and a savings plan. The three benefit plans were es-
tablished by the debtor's employer and were tax-qualified. To-
29. Id. at 921-22.
30. Id. at 923. The court delayed ruling on the exemption issue until a later date.
31. Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 Bankr. 181, 189 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984)
(qualified annuity, stock, and savings plans; corporate plan); Warren v. G.M. Scott &
Sons (In re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543, 544 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (qualified profit-shar-
ing pension plan; corporate plan); Shults v. Rose's Stores, Inc. (In re Holt), 32 Bankr.
767, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (qualified profit-sharing plan; corporate plan); In re
Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (qualified pension plan; corporate
plan); Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927, 929 (D. Kan.
1982) (qualified pension plan; corporate plan), rev'g 20 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1982); In re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181, 183 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (qualified profit-sharing
plan; corporate plan); Pulles, ERISA Plans in Bankruptcy, HENNEPIN LAW., Sept.-Oct.
1984, at 19, 24; Comment, The Fate of ERISA-Qualified Pension Plans Under the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code, 11 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 1045, 1066-70 (1985); cf. Note, Corpo-
rate Pension Plans as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1113, 1131-
32 (1985) (advocating a. general exclusion of ERISA plans, except cases in which
"debtor's conduct is designed to defraud creditors").
32. See infra Part I(D).
33. Recently, a handful of courts has adopted another minority interpretation of
§ 541(c)(2). These courts have held that § 541(c)(2) can never be used to exclude ERISA
plans from the property of the estate, even if they are enforceable as spendthrift trusts
under state law. See infra note 77. The courts have failed to articulate a persuasive basis
for their holdings. See id.
34. 42 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984).
[VOL. 19:1
Individual Bankruptcy
gether the plans held approximately $40,000 in present value
benefits.3 5 The bankruptcy court analyzed the spendthrift trust
law of New Jersey, and concluded that the plans would only be
partially exempt from creditors under state law.36 The court,
however, also found that ERISA itself created a complete ex-
emption from creditors, so section 541(c)(2) would exclude the
entire interest from the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
3 7
Thus, none of the debtor's interests in the ERISA retirement
plans were distributed to his creditors.
The following subsections develop a legal standard to govern
the applicability of section 541(c)(2), and apply that standard to
a number of typical ERISA retirement plans.
A. "Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law" as State Spendthrift
Trust Law
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, and the struc-
ture of and policies behind the Code, compel the conclusion that
section 541(c)(2) was intended to apply only to spendthrift
trusts enforceable under state law.
1. The statutory language- Section 541(c)(2) excludes from
the property of the estate property that is subject to "restric-
tion[s] on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust" that are "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law." ' There is some ambiguity as to whether the "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" is state law, federal law, or both.39 It is
therefore useful to examine other indices of congressional
intent.
4 0
35. Id. at 183.
36. Id. at 188.
37. Id. at 191.
38. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
39. Although § 541(c)(2) appears to refer to all law, both federal and state, outside of
Title 11, this is not necessarily the case. In other sections of the Code, references to
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" have been held to refer to only state law. See Goff v.
Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 586 n.33 (5th Cir. 1983) (reference to "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" in 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) refers to state law of joint tenancy). In
addition, Congress has elsewhere in the Code made explicit reference to "federal"
nonbankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
40. See generally Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1976); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)
("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may
appear on 'superficial examination.' ") (footnotes omitted). But see In re Pruitt, 30
Bankr. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (§ 541(c)(2) is "clear on its face," so "there is no
need to resort to legislative history").
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2. The legislative history of section 541(c)(2)- Under the
old Bankruptcy Act (Act),41 the extent of the property of the
estate was defined in terms of the transferability or leviability of
the bankrupt's interest.4 2 Property that was exempt from judi-
cial process under state law therefore did not pass to the trustee
in bankruptcy.
43
The transferability-leviability standard, when applied to the
bankrupt's beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust, meant that
the interest was not part of the estate if it could not be trans-
ferred or levied under state law. 44 To the extent that a state rec-
ognized the validity of a spendthrift trust provision, the trustee
in bankruptcy had no right to the trust fund.45
The new Bankruptcy Code departed significantly from the
Act's definition of property of the estate. All exempt property,
even that necessary for a "fresh start, ' 46 is initially included in
the estate, and then the debtor is permitted to claim specifically
delineated exemptions under section 522. 47 Thus, Congress elim-
inated the Act's transferability-leviability standard. In its place,
it required that "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property" become property of the estate.4 s
41. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
42. See Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984). Sec-
tion 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act provided:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt.. . shall. . . be vested by the
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the
petition [to] . . . (5) property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing
of the petition he could by any means have transferred or which might have
been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise,
seized, impounded or sequestered.
11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (repealed 1979).
43. See Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903).
44. See Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); Stebbins v.
Crocker Citizens Nat'l (In re Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 913 (1975); In re McLoughlin, 507 F.2d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 1975); Danning v. Led-
erer, 232 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1956).
45. See Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981); First North-
western Trust Co. v. I.R.S., 622 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1980); Erickson v. Bank of Cal., 28
Wash. App. 337, 623 P.2d 721, 724-25 (1981), modified on other grounds, 97 Wash. 2d
246, 643 P.2d 670 (1982); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 139, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 197 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT], reprinted in 2 L. KING, supra note 16, at (Appen-
dix) I-1, 197; E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 356 (2d ed. 1947).
46. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam) (property that bankrupt
needed to make a "fresh start" after discharge was excluded from the estate under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 368, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 6324; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 17, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5868.
48. See Miller v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. (In re Cook), 43 Bankr. 996, 999
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Under the Code's broad new definition of property of the es-
tate, a debtor's beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust would
come into the estate.49  Congress therefore added section
541(c)(2), which it intended would preserve the exclusion that
spendthrift trusts enjoyed under the old Act.5 0 The House com-
mittee report on the proposed bankruptcy code states: "The bill
. . . continues over [from the Act] the exclusion from property
of the estate of the debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust to
the extent the trust is protected from creditors under applica-
ble State law."5 1 The Senate committee report similarly states
that section 541(c)(2) "preserves restrictions on a transfer of a
spendthrift trust. . . enforceable [under] nonbankruptcy
law." 52 Although neither the statute nor the legislative history
expressly limits the section 541(c)(2) exclusion to enforceable
spendthrift trusts, the compelling inference from the legislative
history is that Congress merely intended that the section would
preserve the traditional exclusion that had been granted to en-
forceable spendthrift trusts under the old Bankruptcy Act.
Despite this language in the legislative history, several courts
(N.D. Ind. 1984); 4 L. KING, supra note 16, at 541.02(1); Rendleman, Liquidation
Bankruptcy Under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 575, 594-95 (1980); supra notes
16-17 and accompanying text.
49. Restrictions on attachment and alienation that typically accompany spendthrift
trusts are invalidated in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
See supra text accompanying note 19.
50. See cases cited supra note 25.
51. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 175-76, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs, at 6136 (emphasis added) (stating further that "[tihe bankruptcy of the bene-
ficiary should not be permitted to defeat the legitimate expectations of the settlor of the
trust"). There is a similar statement in the section-by-section analysis of the House re-
port: "Paragraph (2) of subsection (c) [of § 541] preserves restrictions on transfer of a
spendthrift trust to the extent the restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law." Id. at 369, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6325 (empha-
sis added).
52. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 17, at 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 5869 (emphasis added); see also 124 CONG. REc. 33,999 (1978) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini).
The Senate bankruptcy bill originally only excluded § 541(c)(2) property to the extent
"reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents." See S. REP. No.
989, supra note 17, at 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5869. This
limitation appears to reflect the Bankruptcy Commission's belief that there was no rea-
son why spendthrift trust property should generally be excluded from the estate. See
BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 45, at 193, 197 (recommending that "spend-
thrift trust provisions be enforceable only to the extent . . . reasonably necessary for
• . . support" because "[tihere is no sound justification for permitting a debtor to take
advantage of the Bankruptcy Act and, at the same time, to shield from his creditors
assets because local law does not allow creditors to reach his interest"). The Senate's
limitation on the exclusion of spendthrift trust property was rejected by Congress in the
enacted legislation. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
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have held that section 541(c)(2) refers not only to spendthrift
trusts enforceable under state law, but to all restrictions on the
transfer of a beneficial interest in a trust that are enforceable
under any nonbankruptcy law, including federal law. With re-
spect to ERISA retirement plans, these courts note that ERISA
prohibits creditors from attaching a debtor's interest in a plan
prior to bankruptcy because ERISA creates a per se federal ex-
emption from creditors' process for all ERISA retirement
plans.53 Therefore, under the minority interpretation, which in-
cludes federal nonbankruptcy laws within the section 541(c)(2)
exclusion, all ERISA retirement plans would be excluded from
the property of the estate, not just those that are enforceable
under state spendthrift trust law.54 As the next two subsections
demonstrate, however, the structure of and policies behind the
Bankruptcy Code preclude a finding that section 541(c)(2) was
intended to encompass all ERISA retirement plans.5
3. Structure of the Bankruptcy Code- Two aspects of the
structure of the Code demonstrate that Congress did not intend
to grant a blanket exclusion for all ERISA retirement plans pur-
suant to section 541(c)(2). First, the language in the alternative
bankruptcy-nonbankruptcy exemption scheme56 suggests that
Congress intended that ERISA retirement plans be exempted
from the property of the estate, rather than excluded under sec-
tion 541(c)(2).
Even if the debtor's interest in property is included in the
property of the estate, the debtor may nevertheless claim an ex-
53. Not all commentators and courts agree that ERISA creates a per se federal ex-
emption from creditors' process in the nonbankruptcy context. Some have argued that
ERISA preempts the state law of creditors' rights and that federal common law should
govern the enforceability of ERISA plan restrictions on assignment and alienation. See
infra notes 167 & 171 and accompanying text. Under this minority view, some ERISA
plans would be exempt from creditor process outside of bankruptcy, and others would
not.
Part I(D) argues that the better view is that ERISA creates a per se exemption. This
view has been adopted by virtually all courts, and it appears to be required by the recent
congressional amendments to ERISA. See infra Part I(D).
54. See cases cited supra note 31.
55. A number of the objections to the minority interpretation of § 541(c)(2) presume
that ERISA creates a per se federal exemption from creditor process for all ERISA
plans. See infra text at notes 67 & 72; text following infra note 71. These arguments turn
on the conclusion in Part I(D) that ERISA creates a per se federal exemption and does
not authorize the creation of federal common law to govern the enforceability of ERISA
plan restrictions on assignment and alienation. If the courts ultimately conclude that
there is no per se exemption, these arguments would lose much of their force. If the
federal common law interpretation were adopted, some, rather than all, ERISA plans
would be exempt from creditor process outside of bankruptcy. See supra note 53.
56. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 19:1
FALL 1985] Individual Bankruptcy
emption for the property, thereby shielding it from his creditors'
claims. Under the Code, the debtor is generally able to elect"7
either a set of federal Code exemptions"' or a set of state and
federal non-Code exemptions. 59 If the debtor chooses the state
and federal non-Code exemptions, he may exempt, among other
things, "any property that is exempt under Federal [nonbank-
ruptcy] law .. .or State or local law." 0 If the debtor instead
chooses the federal Code exemptions, he may exempt, among
other things, his right to receive "a payment under a stock bo-
nus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan," includ-
ing ERISA plans.61
In light of the language of these exemptions, it is difficult to
believe that Congress's use of the term "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) was intended to include federal
law, such as ERISA, rather than just the state law of spendthrift
trusts. The explicit references to "federal nonbankruptcy law"
and "pension plans" in the exemptions demonstrate that Con-
gress knew how to include federal laws within the scope of sec-
tion 541(c)(2). The fact that Congress did not use these terms in
section 541(c)(2), but instead used the ambiguous term "applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law," suggests that Congress intended that
ERISA plans should be dealt with by way of exemption, not ex-
clusion.62 Moreover, as will be demonstrated in Part II, Congress
57. The Code permits states to opt out of the federal exemption system. If a state
opts out, the debtor may only claim the state and federal non-Code exemptions. 11
U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985). Thirty-four states have chosen to opt out of the
federal exemption scheme. 3 L. KING, supra note 16, at § 522.02.
58. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1),(d) (West Supp. 1985).
59. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
60. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982) (emphasis added).
62. See Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1984) ("We
* . .see a coherent scheme regarding a debtor's pension rights under the Code consistent
with the Code's general policy. The question of pension rights is dealt with as a matter of
exemption."); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 586 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Congress
made reference to federal law and pension benefits when such a characterization was
intended; yet it did not do so in Section 541(c)(2)."). There is some authority in the
legislative history to support the view that Congress intended to deal with ERISA retire-
ment plans by way of exemption, rather than exclusion. In the hearings held prior to the
passage of the Code, Senator Quentin Burdick questioned the interplay between ERISA
and the Code's exemption provision:
Senator BURDICK. What provision would you recommend to reconcile the pro-
visions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 with Section 4-
503(c)(6) of the commission's bill and 4-503(e)(5) of the judge's bill?
Mr. CREEDON. This I guess has to do with the fact that ERISA provides that a
pension benefit is not assignable and the Commission's bill would allow an ex-
emption only with respect to that portion of the pension plan that is necessary
for the bankrupt's maintenance.
I guess something could be put in the Bankruptcy Act to the effect that not-
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intended that a debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan
not be exempt under the state and federal non-Code exemption
for "property that is exempt under Federal [nonbankruptcyl
law." It would frustrate Congress's intent to hold that the
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) re-
fers to ERISA, after Congress had concluded that the phrase
"Federal [nonbankruptcy] law" does not refer to ERISA. 3
The second aspect of the Code's structure that demonstrates
Congress did not intend section 541(c)(2) to exclude all ERISA
retirement plans from the estate pertains to the federal Code
exemption granted to retirement plans. Under section
522(d)(10)(E), 4 the debtor's right to receive a payment under a
retirement plan is exempt to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor. This exemption is not available, how-
ever, if the plan (i) was established by an "insider,"65 (ii) the
payment is on account of age or length of service, and (iii) the
plan is not tax-qualified under the Internal Revenue Code."
If section 541(c)(2) is read as excluding all ERISA retirement
plans from the property of the estate, section 522(d)(10)(E)(iii)
would be rendered surplusage.67 If Congress intended that no
tax-qualified plans would become property of the estate, there
would be no reason to require, as a prerequisite for disqualifica-
tion from the exemption, that the plan is not qualified. Presum-
ably, every retirement plan that a debtor claims as exempt
under section 522(d)(10)(E) would not be tax-qualified. 8 Section
withstanding the provision in ERISA or otherwise, the trustee will be able to get
to the excess.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Ju-
dicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 678
(1975) (emphasis added).
63. See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1983).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982); see infra Part II(B).
65. The term "insider" is defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (West Supp. 1985).
66. See infra note 220 for the complete text of § 522(d)(10)(E).
67. See Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1984), afl'g
24 Bankr. 305, 311 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982); In re Elsea, 47 Bankr. 142, 147 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1985); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare
Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 Bankr. 893, 899 (D.S.C. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786, 788 (Bankr..
N.D. Ohio 1983); Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434, 437
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982).
68. A modified version of this argument has been presented in a number of cases. It
is considerably weaker than the argument presented in the text, and several courts have
justifiably balked at the use of this modified version of the argument. The argument is
that, because § 522(d)(10)(E) creates an exemption for ERISA retirement plans, Con-
gress intended that no retirement plans would be excluded from the estate under
§ 541(c)(2). See, e.g., Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr.
916, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[Olne can inferentially conclude that since Congress
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541(c)(2) must therefore be construed so that it does not exclude
all ERISA plans from the property of the estate, so that the de-
tailed requirements of section 522(d)(10)(E)(iii) are not ren-
dered wholly superfluous. 9
4. Policies of the Bankruptcy Code- Two strong policies re-
flected in the Code would be frustrated if all ERISA retirement
plans were excluded from the property of the estate. First, the
Code was intended to broaden the "property of the estate"
available to creditors.70 Under the old Bankruptcy Act, certain
ERISA plans were routinely held to be property of the estate.7 1
If all ERISA plans were excluded from the estate under section
541(c)(2), Congress's intent to broaden the property of the es-
tate, and to force the debtor to claim specifically delineated ex-
emptions, would be defeated.
Second, a broad exclusion for all ERISA retirement plans
would defeat the Bankruptcy Code's policy of transferring the
debtor's assets to his creditors in satisfaction of their claims. 72
created a separate exemption, for pension plans under Section 522(d)(10)(E), Congress
did not intend that the Section 541(c)(2) exception be extended to ERISA plans."). This
argument is clearly wrong because it is not inconsistent for Congress to provide for some
ERISA plans to be excluded under § 541(c)(2), while others are exempted under
§ 522(d)(10)(E). See McLean v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund (In re McLean), 762 F.2d 1204,1207-08 (4th Cir. 1985); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff),
706 F.2d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330, 331-32 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1983); Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927, 930 (D. Kan.
1982).
69. See generally Duke v. University of Tex., 663 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1981) ("It is
well established that a statute should be construed so that each of its provisions is given
its full effect; interpretations which render parts of a statute inoperative or superfluous
are to be avoided.") (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609,
633 (1973)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 386 (1984).
70. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17,
at 175, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6136 ("[The Act was] a com-
plicated melange of references to State law, and [did] little to further the bankruptcy
policy of distribution of the debtor's property to his creditors in satisfaction of his
debts."); Rendleman, supra note 48, at 594-95.
71. Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981) (Keogh plan); Eisen-
berg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Keogh plan); In
re Mendenhall, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 127 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1980) (Keogh plan); In re
Jenkins, 2 BANKS. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1697 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (employer-created ERISA pen-
sion plan).
Several cases did hold, under § 70(a) of the old Bankruptcy Act, that ERISA retire-
ment plan funds were not property of the estate. See, e.g., Turpin v. Wente (In re Tur-
pin), 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re
Parker), 473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). Because the Code broadened the general
definition of property of the estate, these cases are presumably no longer good law. See
Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 921 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1983).
72. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (the two-fold purposes of
bankruptcy are to convert the debtor's estate into cash for distributing to listed creditors
Journal of Law Reform
There is a strong public policy interest against allowing individ-
uals to create their own ERISA trust (such as a Keogh plan),
contribute a large amount of money, and then claim it as im-
mune from creditors.7 3 It is highly unlikely that Congress in-
tended to overturn this established policy without explicitly in-
dicating its intention to do so. In addition, this would frustrate
Congress's intent in enacting section 522(d)(10)(E), which ex-
empts ERISA retirement plans, but only to the extent "reasona-
bly necessary for the support of the debtor. '74 Section 541(c)(2)
contains no such limitation on the amount that can be
excluded.
75
If section 541(c)(2) is read to include only those ERISA retire-
ment plans that are spendthrift trusts under state law, these
policies of the Code would be furthered. A narrow reading of
section 541(c)(2) would give effect to the broad definition of
property of the estate in section 541(a)(1). In addition, the re-
strictions on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the bene-
ficiaries' interests that are contained in valid spendthrift trusts
assure that creditors will not be unjustly denied the assets of the
debtor.
In summary, therefore, the legislative history, structure, and
policies of the Bankruptcy Code support the conclusion that sec-
tion 541(c)(2) excludes from the property of the bankruptcy es-
tate only those ERISA retirement plans that are enforceable
spendthrift trusts under state law.76 The position taken by the
and to provide an unencumbered fresh start to the debtor).
73. See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 588 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Elsea, 47
Bankr. 142, 148 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr. 72, 78-79 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1984); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr.
916, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (self-settled
spendthrift trusts against public policy); cf. Johnson v. Fenslage (In re Johnson), 724
F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1984) (employee-funded annuity); Judson v. Witlin (In re Wit-
lin), 640 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1981) (Keogh plan under Bankruptcy Act); Bass v.
Shackelford (In re Shackelford), 27 Bankr. 372, 373 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1983) (IRA); Na-
tional Bank of N. Am. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local No. 3, Pension &
Vacation Funds, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127, 132 (1979) (nonbankruptcy case).
74. See infra Part II(B).
75. See supra note 52.
76. If the debtor's interest in an ERISA plan is included in the property of the estate,
the question arises as to the tax consequences when the retirement plan trustee complies
with the bankruptcy trustee's turnover order. ERISA requires that plans must provide
that plan benefits may not be assigned or alienated. See supra notes 7-8 and accompany-
ing text. It is possible that an entire ERISA retirement fund and each of the company's
covered employees would lose the tax advantages granted by ERISA whenever a trustee
of the fund complies with a bankruptcy court's order to turn over one employee's inter-
est in the fund. See I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling No. 8131020 (May 5, 1981). To avoid
this anomalous result, several courts have held that the passage of the Bankruptcy Code
in 1978 impliedly repealed, for purposes of bankruptcy proceedings, ERISA's prohibition
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minority of courts, that section 541(c)(2) excludes all ERISA
plans because creditors outside of bankruptcy cannot reach plan
benefits, is inconsistent with congressional intent."
on assignment and alienation. See Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1982); Fire-
stone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 922-23 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1983); In re Wood, 23 Bankr. 552, 559-61 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); Clotfelter v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 24
Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the presumption against repeals by im-
plication is a strong one and may only be overcome by either an affirmative showing of
congressional intent to repeal or a showing that the two acts are completely irreconcila-
ble. See United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1974); Re-
gional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
550 (1974). Because there is nothing in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code
that clearly demonstrates Congress's intent to repeal ERISA's prohibitions on assign-
ment and alienation in the bankruptcy context, the two statutes must be completely
irreconcilable before a repeal will be implied.
ERISA can be construed in a way that eliminates the conflict with the Code, and thus
avoids the necessity of implying a partial repeal of ERISA by the Code. ERISA does not,
by its terms, prohibit the assignment and alienation of retirement plan benefits; rather,
ERISA merely requires that all retirement plans contain a provision stating that benefits
may not be assigned or alienated. See supra notes 7-8. Under this reading of the statute,
there is no conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. ERISA requires the provision, and the
Code invalidates the effect of that provision in bankruptcy when the plan does not con-
stitute an enforceable spendthrift trust. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(1)(A) (West Supp.
1985); supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. The ERISA provision would still have
effect outside the bankruptcy context. See infra Part I(D). This interpretation of the
relationship between ERISA and the Code is confirmed by the text of ERISA, which
provides that it was not intended to supersede any other federal law. See infra note 188.
It is possible, therefore, to read § 541(c)(2) as only applying to ERISA retirement
plans that are enforceable under state spendthrift trust law, without also finding that the
Code impliedly repealed a portion of ERISA. Given the strong presumption against re-
peals by implication, this is the preferred interpretation.
77. The majority and minority positions discussed in the text have been adopted by
virtually all courts. There is an additional minority position that deserves comment.
A few courts have taken the position that § 541(c)(2) can never be used to exclude
ERISA retirement plan benefits from the property of the estate. In contrast, the major-
ity view would exclude retirement plans if they are enforceable as spendthrift trusts
under state law.
There are four reasons advanced by courts subscribing to the alternative minority
view. None of these reasons are, however, persuasive. First, these courts have argued that
ERISA plans are distinguishable from "traditional" spendthrift trusts. This argument is
explained and criticized in the text accompanying infra notes 83-89.
Second, these courts have argued that because § 522(d)(10)(E) exempts ERISA retire-
ment plans from the property of the estate, the implication is that Congress did not
intend the plans to be excluded under § 541(c)(2). See Nelson v. White (In re White), 47
Bankr. 410, 412 (W.D. Wash. 1985); see also supra note 68. This argument ignores the
fact that exclusion of some plans under § 541(c)(2) is not inconsistent with exemption of
all other plans not excluded. See supra note 68.
Third, courts accepting the alternative minority position argue that the restriction on
exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E) to amounts "reasonably necessary for support" would
be undermined if some plans were completely excluded under § 541(c)(2). See Nelson, 47
Bankr. at 412-13. It is possible, however, that Congress concluded that a few ERISA
retirement plans so completely restricted access to the funds that it would be superfluous
to restrict the amount that could be excluded. Therefore, the exclusion of some ERISA
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B. Application of State Spendthrift Trust Law to ERISA
Retirement Plans
Under the legal standard developed in Part I(A), the debtor's
interest in an ERISA retirement plan will be excluded from the
property of the estate only if the plan is enforceable as a spend-
thrift trust under the laws of the state in which the bankruptcy
court sits or in which the retirement fund is located . Because
the law of spendthrift trusts varies widely from state to state,
the following is meant only to be a general overview of the con-
siderations involved when bankruptcy courts apply this law to
ERISA retirement plans.79
Spendthrift trusts are, generally, trusts that prohibit the vol-
untary and involuntary alienation of the principal and income of
a trust.80 In most states, spendthrift provisions are enforceable,
either without qualification or to a limited extent, against claims
by the creditors of the beneficiary.' The recent trend, however,
has been to permit certain classes of claimants (such as those
claiming alimony or child support) to reach a beneficiary's inter-
est in a trust, regardless of the spendthrift clauses.82
plans under § 541(c)(2) is not inconsistent with the "reasonably necessary for support"
limitation in § 522(d)(10)(E).
Fourth, one court has argued that "an ERISA plan cannot be a spendthrift trust under
state law" because "ERISA supersedes all state laws with respect to ERISA plans.
[ERISA § 514(a),] 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)." Nelson, 47 Bankr. at 413. The court's reasoning
is unclear. ERISA's preemption of state laws is typically an argument in favor of exclud-
ing all ERISA plans from the property of the estate, rather than including all plans. See
supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
One recent court of appeals decision appears to support the position that ERISA re-
tirement plans may never be excluded from the property of the estate under § 541(c)(2).
See Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir.
1985). Although the court did fail to explicitly compare the terms of debtor's pension
and profit-sharing plan against the applicable state spendthrift trust law, it is clear that
the plan, established by the debtor's own professional corporation, would be an invalid
self-settled spendthrift trust under the law of any state. See infra Part I (B)(2)(b).
78. See, e.g., Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 310 n.4 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1982) (law of the state in which the court sits), afld, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984);
SSA Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. Bizon, 42 Bankr. 338, 344 (D. Md. 1984) (law of the
state in which the fund is located).
79. See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222,
at 408 n.94 (rev. 2d ed. 1979) (state-by-state description of spendthrift trust statutes and
case law); 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 152.1 (3d ed. 1967).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
supra note 79, § 222 at 383; 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 79, at § 151.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
supra note 79, § 222 at 406; 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 79, at § 152.
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
supra note 79, § 222 at 383; 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 79, at § 157.
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Before determining whether a particular ERISA retirement
plan is an enforceable spendthrift trust under state law, a court
must determine whether any type of ERISA retirement plan can
be a "spendthrift trust."
1. Retirement plans as "spendthrift trusts"- A minority of
courts has held that ERISA retirement plan benefits may never
be excluded from the property of the estate under section
541(c)(2) because ERISA plans are not "spendthrift trusts."8
The legislative history of section 541(c)(2) refers only to the ex-
clusion of spendthrift trusts, 4 and these courts have apparently
concluded that the characteristics of ERISA plans are suffi-
ciently different to distinguish them from "traditional" spend-
thrift trusts.
8 6
The better view, held by a majority of courts, 6 is that the
spendthrift restrictions included in ERISA retirement plans8"
are indistinguishable from spendthrift restrictions traditionally
enforceable under state law.88 Because the legislative history
does not limit the application of section 541(c)(2) to "tradi-
tional" spendthrift trusts, an ERISA retirement plan that is oth-
erwise a spendthrift trust under state law should not be denied
spendthrift trust status under section 541(c)(2) merely because
it was established under ERISA.as
Assuming that all ERISA retirement plans may potentially be
characterized as spendthrift trusts for purposes of section
541(c)(2), the courts are faced with the complex question of
83. See Nelson v. White (In re White), 47 Bankr. 410, 412-13 (W.D. Wash. 1985); In
re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786, 788 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); cf. American Nat'l Bank v. Huff
(In re Huff), 42 Bankr. 553, 556 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (court states, without analysis,
that because § 541(c)(2) applies to state spendthrift trusts, it does not apply to the Illi-
nois Employee Deferred Compensation Plan).
84. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
85. See Nelson v. White (In re White), 47 Bankr. 410, 412 (W.D. Wash. 1985) ("It
does not appear anywhere in the legislative history that Congress contemplated applica-
tion of Section 541(c)(2) to ERISA plans."); In re Kelley, 31 Bankr. 786, 788 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1983) ("[It appears from the legislative history that section 541(c)(2) is lim-
ited in its application to true spendthrift trusts, as distinguished from ERISA-type
trusts.").
86. The conclusion that ERISA retirement plans can be included within the term
"spendthrift trust" is impliedly accepted by all those courts that have held ERISA plans
to be enforceable spendthrift trusts in bankruptcy. See infra note 143.
87. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
88. See supra text accompanying note 80.
89. McLean v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (In re
McLean), 762 F.2d at 1204, 1207 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[Section] 541(c)(2) should [not] be
confined in its recognition of enforceable transfer restrictions to those found in 'tradi-
tional' spendthrift trusts. The language of § 541(c)(2) does not suggest such a limitation,
and the legislative history reveals only that the provision has the unambiguous purpose
of preserving enforceable transfer restrictions in spendthrift trusts.").
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whether a particular retirement plan is an enforceable spend-
thrift trust. States that recognize the enforceability of spend-
thrift trusts typically draw a distinction between self-settled
trusts and other trusts. This distinction is examined below in
light of the characteristics of ERISA retirement plans.
2. Self-settled spendthrift trusts- Virtually all states pro-
vide that when a person creates a spendthrift trust consisting of
his own property and naming himself as beneficiary, the spend-
thrift provisions are invalid against the claims of his creditors.9 0
The "self-settled" spendthrift trust is invalid because creditors
have a right that the debtor pay their claims before he makes a
provision for his own comfort. 1 If an ERISA retirement plan
can be characterized as a self-settled spendthrift trust, it will
generally be included in the property of the estate.
Whether an ERISA retirement plan is characterized as self-
settled under state law may be a difficult question. There are at
least two possible legal standards. First, a trust may be self-set-
tled when the beneficiary funds the trust, directly or indirectly.
The typical method of creating a self-settled trust is by transfer-
ring property to a trust for one's own benefit. A trust may be
self-settled even when the corpus is contributed by another, if
the circumstances indicate that, in reality, the beneficiary is the
true settlor. When an ERISA retirement plan is funded, in
whole or in part, by the contributions or efforts of the benefi-
ciary, the plan must be considered self-settled, but only to the
extent of his contributions.2 Courts occasionally fail to observe
the pro tanto principle, incorrectly holding that an entire retire-
ment plan is self-settled if any portion was contributed by the
beneficiary.9 3
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
supra note 79, § 223 at 438-39; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 45, at § 474; 2 A. SCOTT, supra
note 79, at § 156.
91. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 79, at § 223; 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 79,
at § 156.
92. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.124 (1952) ("The question is, whose prop-
erty was actually used for the establishment of the trust?"); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
supra note 79, at § 223; 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 79, at § 156.3.
The notion that a spendthrift trust may be considered self-settled to the extent of the
beneficiary's contributions is well established in spendthrift trust law. For example,
when the beneficiary of a trust pays off an encumbrance on the trust property out of his
own assets, he is pro tanto the creator of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 156 comment f (1959); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 45, at § 488; 2 A. SCOTT, supra
note 79, at § 156.3. The result is the same when the beneficiary expends his own funds in
making improvements on the trust property. See State ex rel. v. Nashville Trust Co., 28
Tenn. App. 388, 190 S.W.2d 785 (1944); 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 79, at § 156.3.
93. See In re Werner, 31 Bankr. 418 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (although employer
matched debtor-employee's contributions to Teacher Retirement Account, the entire
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Some states may define "self-settled" trusts in a second and
much narrower way. Even a trust that is funded by the benefi-
ciary might not be an enforceable self-settled trust if the trust
instrument imposes significant restrictions on the beneficiary's
access to the trust funds. 4 It is unclear whether this is the law
of any state, but such a definition would do little to further the
general public policy against self-settled trusts. Such trusts are
generally unenforceable against creditors because creditors have
a right to be paid before the debtor may provide for himself. If a
debtor could shield his property from his creditors by placing it
in a trust and providing for significant restrictions on his right
to reach the trust corpus, then this public policy is thwarted.
The better view, therefore, appears to be that a trust should
be characterized as a self-settled trust if it is funded by the ben-
eficiary, regardless of the extent of the settlor-beneficiary's ac-
cess to or control of the trust funds. Should any jurisdiction
adopt the view that a trust is not self-settled if it significantly
restricts the beneficiary's access to the corpus, even if funded by
the beneficiary, then the access issues discussed in Parts I(B)(3)
and (4) must also be considered.
Assuming, therefore, that the appropriate test to determine
whether a spendthrift trust is "self-settled" is the extent to
which the trust is funded by the beneficiary, there are a number
of types of ERISA retirement plans that will often be considered
self-settled, and therefore included in the property of the bank-
ruptcy estate.
a. Keogh plans- Self-employed individuals conducting an
unincorporated trade or business are permitted to adopt a tax-
qualified retirement plan for themselves and their employees."
When the owner or partner covered by such a Keogh plan files
for bankruptcy, the plan is uniformly held to be a self-settled
spendthrift trust.9 6
fund was not a spendthrift trust because the debtor "created his own trust"); Clotfelter
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (applying
Kansas law), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982) (although debtor
employee had contributed $13,000 to ERISA savings plan and employer had provided
matching funds of over $8,000, the court held that the entire fund was not a "traditional
spendthrift trust" because, among other things, "it is the funds of the beneficiary that
are being placed in trust").
94. Cf. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 589 n.42 (5th Cir. 1983) (court leaves
open the question of "whether an appropriate case might be presented in which the re-
strictions upon a settlor-beneficiary's control and withdrawal of funds in a self-settled
trust would ever render effective a spendthrift clause" under Texas law).
95. 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(c) (West 1978 & Supp. 1985); supra note 10.
96. See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1983) (owner,
Texas law); In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 830 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (owner,
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The case of In re Ridenour97 provides a good illustration of
this principle. The debtor was a partner in a small law firm, and
the partnership had created and funded a Keogh plan for the
partners." The debtor claimed his interest in the plan was ex-
cluded from the property of the estate under section 541(c)(2),
but the bankruptcy court held that, under Tennessee law, the
plan was an unenforceable self-settled spendthrift trust.9 The
debtor had contended that the pension plan was funded not by
him but by a separate entity, the partnership. 100 The court re-
jected this argument, stating flatly: "[T]he act of the partner-
ship in establishing and contributing to the pension plan was
essentially the act of each of the partners. The partnership was
the agent of the debtor in establishing a pension plan for his
benefit."' 01 Although the Ridenour court's analysis is valid in
the context of a small law partnership, 10 2 it is unclear whether
the creation of a Keogh plan by a partnership composed of sev-
Tennessee law); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67, 77
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (owner, Virginia law); In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr. 72, 79 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1984) (partner, Tennessee law); cf. Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12
Bankr. 412, 417 n.6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dictum) (owner, New York law); Judson v.
Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661, 662-63 (5th Cir. 1981) (Bankruptcy Act case, Texas
law); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 90 Misc. 2d 673, 395 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
(nonbankruptcy case, New York law), aff'd, 102 Misc. 2d 235, 425 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979); Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Bank of N.Y., 91 Misc. 2d. 837, 398
N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (nonbankruptcy case, New York law), aff'd, 102 Misc.
2d 235, 425 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). But see In re Diaz, 50 Bankr. 22, 23
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (Keogh plan not an invalid self-settled spendthrift trust because
"public policy favors making provision for one's old age").
Even if the interest of the owner or partner of the business is deemed to be self-
settled, that does not necessarily mean that the interests of the employees of the busi-
ness or partnership should be deemed to be self-settled. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 45,
at § 282.1 ("Where a person creates a trust with spendthrift provisions, with himself and
others as beneficiaries, the invalidity of the restraint extends only to his own interest.
The spendthrift clause is valid as to the non-settlor beneficiaries.").
Individual retirement funds are also uniformly considered to be self-settled trusts be-
cause, like Keogh plans, they are funded with the debtor's own property. See In re How-
erton, 21 Bankr. 621, 622 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (Individual Retirement Annuity
held not to create a spendthrift "trust"; if a trust were created, it would be an invalid
self-settled trust under Texas law). Individual retirement funds will also only rarely be
classified as spendthrift trusts because ERISA does not require that the accounts restrict
assignment or alienation. See supra note 11.
97. 45 Bankr. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984).
98. Id. at 74, 79.
99. Id. at 78-79.
100. Id. at 79.
101. Id. (stating further: "The contributions were based on a percentage of his earn-
ings and were made from partnership funds in which he plainly had a pro rata share of
ownership. In short, the debtor was both the settlor and the beneficiary of his pension
plan.").
102. It appears that the Ridenour partnership had only three partners. See id. at 74
n.1.
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eral hundred partners should realistically be attributed to each
partner as his own act. This more difficult case could not be re-
solved merely by references to hornbook partnership law, but
would require a close examination of the factual situation.
b. Professional corporations and sole-shareholder corpora-
tions- The second type of ERISA retirement plans that will
often be deemed to be invalid as self-settled spendthrift trusts
are plans adopted by professional corporations and sole-share-
holder corporations. Although the settlor is in form the corpora-
tion, the courts have no difficulty finding that the settlor and the
beneficiary are in reality one and the same entity.03 As in the
case of Keogh plans, however, the courts have not yet been faced
with difficult fact situations. If the debtor's interest in the retire-
ment plan was created by a corporation of which he is a share-
holder, how much of the corporation's shares must he own
before the creation and funding of the plan will be attributed to
him as his own act? This question will raise complicated factual
problems for the courts.
c. Employee contributions- Even if the debtor is covered
by an ERISA retirement plan established by his employer, a
large corporation, his interest in the plan may nevertheless be
characterized as self-settled in certain circumstances. Some
plans do not permit employee contributions, but others require
such contributions as a precondition to receiving employer con-
tributions. Some plans also permit voluntary employee contribu-
tions, without employer matching."4 To the extent that the
debtor's interest in the plan consists of his own contributions,
103. See Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1985) (apparently California law); In re La Fata, 41 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984)
(Michigan law) (professional corporation); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr.
305, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) (Iowa law) ("Even though, in form, the settlor is the
[Professional] Corporation, [the debtor's] earnings from his medical practice furnished
the corpus of the trust. [The debtor] is therefore both the settlor and the beneficiary of
the Fund."), afJ'd, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Avery Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Klayer (In re Klayer), 20 Bankr. 270, 274 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (Kentucky law) (close
corporation); cf. United States v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. 62 ((N.D. Tex.
1981) (Texas law, nonbankruptcy case) (professional corporation).
As in the case of Keogh plans, however, the interests of the corporation's employees
would probably not automatically be deemed self-settled. See supra note 96.
104. See M. CANAN, supra note 2, at § 14.
The Internal Revenue Code also permits qualified profit-sharing and stock bonus plans
to include a "qualified cash or deferred compensation arrangement" in which the em-
ployee is allowed to elect to receive either cash or an employer contribution to the plan.
See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1982). To the extent that plan benefits are a result of such an ar-
rangement, the benefits should be treated as if they were the result of voluntary em-
ployee contributions.
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the interest should be deemed to be self-settled.'0 5 This is true
regardless of whether the employee's contributions are voluntary
or mandatory. 0 6
d. All retirement plans as self-settled- As described above,
the courts have developed nice distinctions to determine
whether the debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan is
self-settled under state law and therefore available to creditors
in bankruptcy. An alternative interpretation is that all retire-
ment plans are self-settled, regardless of who contributes, be-
cause retirement benefits are in essence compensation to
employees.
An employer may have many motives for contributing to an
employee retirement plan, including encouraging employees to
retire at a certain age, and preventing the impression that the
company "does not take care of its own" after employees retire.
One suspects, however, that the primary motive is compensation
to employees. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code treats retire-
ment benefits not as gratuitous transfers, but as compensation;
the tax is merely deferred until the benefits are distributed. The
contributions by the employer to the retirement plan represent,
in large part, lost salary by the employee. The employee has in
effect paid the employer to set up the retirement plan on the
employee's behalf. Under this interpretation of the nature of re-
tirement benefits, all plans would be treated as self-settled, re-
gardless of who in fact contributes the plan funds.
10 7
105. See Johnson v. Fenslage (In re Johnson), 724 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1984) (Texas
law) (group variable annuity established by employer is self-settled by employee where
the employee made all the contributions to the trust); supra note 92 and accompanying
text. But see Avenue Motor Co. v. Emro, 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 157 (1976). Courts occasionally
fail to apply the pro tanto rule, holding the entire fund is self-settled when any portion
consists of employee ccntributions. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. The mere fact that employee contributions are a precondition to matching em-
ployer contributions should not prevent the employee's contributions from being charac-
terized as self-settled pro tanto. In an analogous situation, a beneficiary who pays off an
encumbrance on the trust property is deemed to be the settlor to the extent of the pay-
ment. See supra note 92.
One court has objected that if the employee's mandatory contributions were character-
ized as self-settled, the public policy in favor of encouraging retirement plans would be
frustrated. See Miller v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. (In re Cook), 43 Bankr. 996,
1001 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Indiana law); see also Miller v. Jones (In re Jones), 43 Bankr.
1002, 1006-07 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (same). The court does not, however, address the fact
that spendthrift trust law has a strong policy against allowing a debtor to shield his
assets from his creditors. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
107. Cf. Electrical Workers, Local 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust
Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (Texas law) (employer contributions to em-
ployee vacation trust fund held to be self-settled spendthrift trust by employees); Boyd
v. Curran, 166 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (California law) (pension benefits are not a
gratuity; they arise directly from the employment relationship and therefore should be
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Most courts have not, however, accepted the view that all re-
tirement plans are in essence self-settled.0 . In many states an
ERISA retirement plan will be considered self-settled to the ex-
tent that it consists of contributions by the beneficiary, or by an
entity controlled by the beneficiary."' Thus, although the better
view is that all retirement plans, whether funded by the em-
ployer or the employee, should be deemed to be self-settled, the
courts have not agreed.
If the debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan cannot
be characterized as an invalid self-settled spendthrift trust
under state law, it might nevertheless be an invalid spendthrift
trust for a number of other reasons. The states strongly disagree
over the validity of spendthrift trusts that are not self-settled, so
the following is only intended as a broad overview of the consid-
erations involved when a court attempts to apply state law to
ERISA retirement plans.
3. Present unrestricted right to withdraw plan benefits-
The first factor to consider in determining the validity of a
spendthrift trust that is not self-settled is whether the debtor,
on the date of the bankruptcy petition, had an unrestricted right
to withdraw the principal from the retirement plan. The general
rule is that if the principal of a spendthrift trust is payable im-
mediately to the beneficiary or at any time he may demand it,
then the beneficiary's creditors may reach it. 110 Some cases, how-
treated as earnings); Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 493 (1963) (welfare plans can have the same
legal effect of wages).
It is generally agreed that a spendthrift trust is self-settled when one party pays a
second party consideration to set up a spendthrift trust for the first party. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 comment f (1959); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 45, at 487;
G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 79, at § 223; 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 79, at § 156.3.
108. See, e.g., Miller v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. (In re Cook), 43 Bankr.
996, 1001 (N.D. Ind. 1984) ("Where an ERISA-qualified plan set up by an employer
requires an employee to make contributions to the plan as part of the employee's partici-
pation, the employee cannot be considered a settlor as that term is traditionally used in
the area of spendthrift trusts."); Thomas v. Thomas, 192 Cal. App. 2d 771, 13 Cal. Rptr.
872 (1961) (California law) (employer-created and funded pension plan is not self-settled
by the employee); Avenue Motor Co. v. Emro, 1 Pa. D. & C.3d 157 (1976) (Pennsylvania
law) (employee covered by employer's tax-qualified pension plan is not the settlor of the
plan to the extent of his contributions); Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958) (applying Texas law) (where an employer created a profit-sharing trust for employ-
ees, the trust is not self-settled by the employee merely because he enters the employ or
helps create the profits).
109. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
110. See 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 79, at § 153; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 153(2) (1959).
An obvious corollary to this rule is that if the debtor, at some time prior to the peti-
tion, had an unrestricted right to withdraw the funds but he elected annuity distribution,
then the annuity should be unenforceable against the creditors as a self-settled trust. See
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ever, hold that the creditor may not reach the principal until the
beneficiary has actually received it.111
If the applicable state has adopted the general rule, the
debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan may be an invalid
spendthrift trust under the following circumstances: the debtor
has passed the designated retirement age as of the date of the
petition;112 the debtor has terminated his employment with the
employer prior to the date of the petition;"' the debtor has be-
come disabled prior to the date of the petition and the plan pro-
vides for disability distributions;1 4 or if the plan provides that
benefits may be distributed for "hardship." ' If under the terms
of the particular retirement plan the participant has the right to
a lump-sum distribution of benefits under these circum-
stances," then under the majority rule the occurrence of these
events prior to the filing of the petition for bankruptcy would
invalidate the spendthrift provisions.
For example, in Miller v. Lincoln National Bank and Trust
Co. (In re Cook), 11 7 the debtor's employer had established a sav-
ings and profit-sharing plan for the employees. The plan permit-
ted participants to request distribution of plan benefits before
retirement or termination of employment if the participant
supra Part I(B)(2).
111. See 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 79, at § 153; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 153
comment c (1959).
112. See Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Bank of N.Y., 91 Misc. 2d 837, 398 N.Y.S.2d
814 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (nonbankruptcy case, New York law) (owner of Keogh plan had
passed age 59/2, so plan funds are available for his own use at any time), afl'd, 102 Misc.
2d 235, 425 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
113. Cf. SSA Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. Bizon, 42 Bankr. 338, 345-46 (D. Md.
1984) (Maryland law) (because Maryland enforces partial spendthrift trusts, the fact
that the debtor is entitled to receive a lump-sum distribution upon demand because of
his termination of employment does not invalidate spendthrift provisions). See generally
26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14) (1982) (tax-qualified trusts may pay benefits under the plan
within 60 days of the close of the plan year in which the participant terminates his ser-
vice with the employer). A significant number of employers offer employees a lump-sum
distribution of benefits upon termination of employment. See Salisbury, What Impact
Has ERISA Had on Different Types of Pension Plans, in STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 107, 123-24 (Comm. Print 1984).
114. Tax-qualified retirement plans may provide that benefits be distributed upon
the participants' disability. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-1(b)(1) (1980).
115. Unlike pension plans, tax-qualified profit-sharing plans may permit participants
to withdraw benefits upon a showing of financial "hardship." See M. CANAN, supra note
2, at § 3.58; see also infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
116. If the occurrence of these circumstances merely entitles the beneficiary to an
annuity rather than a lump-sum distribution, then only that portion of the annuity due
the participant should be attachable by the creditors.
117. 43 Bankr. 996 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
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could demonstrate "hardship or dire need."'1 8 Under the plan,
hardship or dire need included "illness or death in the partici-
pant's family, education of the participant's children, or
purchase of a residence."11 9 The court held that, under Indiana
law, the debtor's interest in the plan was not an enforceable
spendthrift trust because the debtor has "present access" to the
trust principal. The very fact that the debtor had filed a petition
for bankruptcy demonstrated that the debtor qualified for early
withdrawal due to financial hardship. 20 The debtor's interest in
the plan was therefore included in the property of the estate.
4. Restricted right to withdraw plan benefits: the partial
spendthrift trust issue- Although the states generally agree
that a present, unrestricted right to withdraw the principal of a
spendthrift trust invalidates the spendthrift provisions as to the
beneficiary's creditors, in some instances the circumstances that
give rise to the withdrawal rights may not have yet occurred. A
retirement plan may, for example, grant complete withdrawal
rights to the participant only upon retirement, disability, or ter-
mination of employment. If none of these events have occurred
prior to the date of the bankruptcy petition, the debtor's right to
withdraw is solely prospective.
In some states, an ERISA plan participant's future right to
withdraw the plan benefits may invalidate the plan's spendthrift
provisions. The participant's future right to withdraw makes the
retirement plan analogous to a "partial spendthrift trust" which
may be invalid against the participant's creditors.
The traditional spendthrift trust provides both that the bene-
ficiary cannot alienate his right to future payments of income or
principal and that creditors may not reach his interest in the
118. Id. at 999.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1001; see also Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20
Bankr. 434, 438 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (Kansas law) (the debtor's right to withdraw trust
funds at any time and use them for a number of specified purposes, i.e., layoff, illness,
disability, purchase of a house, tuition expenses, funeral expenses, and other financial
hardship, even though certain withdrawals would suspend the debtor's right to contrib-
ute to the fund for up to 12 months, was a factor in finding no spendthrift trust), rev'd
on other grounds, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982); cf. In re Kenneth Miller, 33 Bankr. 549,
551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (Minnesota law) (profit-sharing plan permitting withdrawal
for financial hardship "is available for current use of the debtor"). But see Rodgers v.
Norman (In re Crenshaw), 51 Bankr. 554, 559-60 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (Illinois law) (debtor
could withdraw plan benefits if he demonstrated "financial need"; held that the requisite
employer consent to withdrawal, although guided by standards in the plan, was a suffi-
cient impediment to withdrawal and that the plan constituted a spendthrift trust).
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trust. 121 When the trust restricts involuntary but not voluntary
alienation, or vice versa, a "partial spendthrift trust"'12 2 is cre-
ated. The states appear to be split on the question of whether
partial spendthrift trusts are enforceable against the benefi-
ciaries' creditors.
12 3
ERISA retirement plans are analogous to partial spendthrift
trusts that restrict creditors' rights but only partially restrict
beneficiaries' rights. ERISA requires that plans provide that
"benefits provided under the plan may not be anticipated, as-
signed (either at law or in equity), alienated or subject to attach-
ment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or equitable
process. '24 Voluntary access to benefits by the participant is not
as severely restricted. Participants may receive a lump-sum dis-
tribution of benefits upon termination of employment.125 ERISA
plans may permit loans to be made from the plan to the partici-
pant, with the loan secured by the participant's interest in the
plan.12 s ERISA plans may permit participants in pay status s1 2  to
assign their rights to future benefits. s12  A plan participant may
also have such control over the plan that he has the power to
121. See, e.g., Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 152(2) (1959); 76 AM. JUa. 2d Trusts § 148.
122. Courts do not always use the term "partial spendthrift trust." Occasionally they
state that a spendthrift trust is invalid if the beneficiary has sufficient dominion or con-
trol over the trust, or access to the trust funds. See, e.g., Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In
re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (111th Cir. 1985).
123. See Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427, 428 (1916)
("[T]here would be difficulty admitting that a person could have property over which he
could exercise all the powers of ownership except to make it liable for his debts."); 2 A.
SCOTT, supra note 79, at § 152.3 (a partial spendthrift trust restraining only the credi-
tor's rights is unenforceable as against public policy); Williams, Partial Spendthrift
Trusts, 50 DICK. L. REv. 79, 85 (1946) (spendthrift restrictions on involuntary, but not
voluntary, alienation are invalid in Pennsylvania). But see SSA Baltimore Fed. Credit
Union v. Bizon, 42 Bankr. 338, 345-46 (D. Md. 1984) (partial spendthrift trusts valid
under Maryland law); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 79, § 222 at 401-02 ("There is
no requirement that the restraint must affect both alienees and creditors."); E. GRIS-
WOLD, supra note 45, at §§ 267, 360.
124. See supra notes 7-8.
125. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
126. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13)(A) (West Supp. 1985); ERISA § 206(d)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(d)(2) (1978); see also Alden, Em-
ployee Loans Are Respectable-At Last!, PENSION WORLD, July 1984, at 46.
127. "Pay status" occurs when the plan participant begins receiving plan benefits.
128. A participant in pay status may voluntarily assign up to 10% of any future ben-
efit payment, if the plan so provides. 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13)(A) (West Supp. 1985);
ERISA § 206(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(d)(2)(1978).
If the plan so provides, a participant in pay status may also make a voluntary revocable
assignment of all future benefit payments. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(e) (1) (1978). Fi-




terminate the plan and force distribution of benefits. 2 '
In a jurisdiction that recognizes the validity of partial spend-
thrift trusts, an ERISA retirement plan provision that permits
withdrawal of plan benefits and voluntary alienation by partici-
pants should not render the spendthrift restrictions on creditors'
rights unenforceable. If a jurisdiction holds partial spendthrift
trusts invalid, on the other hand, the courts must examine the
particular retirement plan to determine whether the partici-
pant's right to withdraw, alienate, or assign the benefits is so
great that the plan must be characterized as a partial, and there-
fore invalid, spendthrift trust. 30
a. Termination of employment- ERISA plans may begin
paying benefits after the participant terminates his employment,
and some plans permit a lump-sum distribution of benefits upon
termination.131 One court has held that a participant's ability to
compel distribution merely by quitting his job meant that the
retirement plan was an invalid partial spendthrift trust. 3 2 The
court failed to acknowledge, however, that in some circum-
stances a requirement that the debtor must terminate his em-
ployment to reach his retirement plan benefits may be a signifi-
cant restriction on his access to the funds.' If the debtor is an
aging auto worker in Michigan who has no income assets, it is
inadequate to argue that he may withdraw his benefits simply
by quitting his job. On the other hand, if the debtor is a young
doctor who can terminate his employment with his own corpora-
tion and begin work again under a new corporate form, termina-
tion of employment may be an illusory barrier to distribution.
The courts should look to the facts of the individual case to de-
129. See ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 2617.1 (1985).
130. But see Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees' Stock Bonus Plan & Trust (In
re DeWeese), 47 Bankr. 251, 255 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (ERISA's provision permitting
various forms of voluntary alienation and assignment means the stock bonus plan is not
a valid spendthrift trust, without regard to whether the plan in question actually permit-
ted the objectionable practices); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health
and Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 Bankr. 893, 897 (D.S.C.
1984) (same), rev'd, 762 F..2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985).
131. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
132. In re Werner, 31 Bankr. 418, 421 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (Minnesota law) (non-
ERISA retirement plan); see also Nixon v. P.J. Pedone & Co. (In re Nichols), 42 Bankr.
772, 776 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (debtor can compel distribution of benefits by termi-
nating employment).
133. See In re Sheridan, 38 Bankr. 52, 56-57 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983) ("It hardly needs
pointing out that it would be foolhardy and self-defeating for the debtor, at age 46, and
without income assets, to voluntarily terminate his employment with the state, thereby
cutting himself off from the means with which to support himself and his dependents.");
see also Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1983) (employment ter-
mination may be a significant restriction on withdrawal of funds).
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termine whether termination of employment is a significant re-
striction on the debtor's access to the plan funds.
1 34
b. Plan loans- ERISA plans may also make loans to plan
participants for any reason, with the loan secured by the partici-
pant's interest in the plan.1"' In a jurisdiction that invalidates
partial spendthrift trusts, the inclusion of a plan provision per-
mitting such loans will be fatal to the debtor's spendthrift trust
claim. 13 There is little difference between receiving a distribu-




c. Voluntary revocable assignment of benefits- ERISA also
permits participants in retirement plans to make a revocable as-
signment of their right to future plan benefits once the partici-
pant enters pay status.13 8 Although some courts have suggested
that a plan provision authorizing voluntary revocable assign-
ment of future plan benefits destroys the enforceability of the
spendthrift clauses,1 3s that result is contrary to established
spendthrift trust law. When a spendthrift trust limits the benefi-
ciary's ability to alienate his right to receive future income pay-
ments, and the beneficiary nevertheless alienates his right, the
134. Few cases have held that a participant's right to benefits upon termination of
employment alone creates a partial spendthrift trust. See cases cited supra note 132. In
fact, valid spendthrift trusts have been found in a number of cases in which termination
of employment would trigger distribution. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Norman (In re Cren-
shaw), 51 Bankr. 554 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (Illinois law); Bezanson v. Maine Nat'l Bank (In
re Kwaak), 42 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985) (Maine law); In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (Indiana law).
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
136. In a number of cases, the presence of a plan provision permitting the debtor to
borrow from the fund, secured by his interest in the plan, has been held to be a factor in
destroying spendthrift trust status. See Nixon v. P.J. Pedone & Co. (In re Nichols), 42
Bankr. 772, 776 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (applying Florida law); Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434, 438 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (applying Kansas
law), rev'd on other grounds, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982); cf. Central States, Southeast
and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean),
41 Bankr. 893, 897 (D.S.C. 1984) (apparently South Carolina law) (ERISA "allowed"
loans from the plan secured by the debtor's interest; without a showing that the plan in
question actually authorized loans, that was a factor in denying spendthrift trust status),
rev'd, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985).
If a particular plan does not permit such loans, that is additional evidence that the
plan is not a partial spendthrift trust. See Bezanson v. Maine Nat'l Bank (In re Kwaak),
42 Bankr. 599, 602 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (Maine law).
137. There are certain restrictions on the amount and term of plan loans if the loan is
not to be treated as a taxable distribution. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 72(p) (West 1984 & Supp.
1985). These restrictions have no effect on the right to make plan loans.
138. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
139. Reagan v. Austin Municipal Credit Union (In re Reagan), 741 F.2d 95, 97 (5th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Wel-
fare Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 Bankr. 893, 897 (D.S.C. 1984),
rev'd. 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985).
Individual Bankruptcy
courts regularly hold that the assignment is valid but revocable
at will by the beneficiary. 4" There is no reason why an ERISA
plan's restrictions should be invalidated merely because its pro-
visions expressly authorize that which the law already author-
izes. Therefore, the inclusion of a plan provision allowing volun-
tary revocable assignments of future plan benefits should not
destroy the spendthrift character of the retirement plan.
d. Plan termination- Finally, if a plan participant has such
control over a retirement plan that he could terminate it at will
and force distribution of benefits, the plan is likely to be charac-
terized as a partial spendthrift trust."" In most cases in which
the participant has such control, however, the plan may also be
characterized as self-settled.",
2
5. Summary of ERISA plans enforceable as spendthrift
trusts- It is dangerous to generalize about spendthrift trust
law, given the wide disagreement among the courts and the
states. However, in the few cases in which a debtor's interest in
an ERISA retirement plan was found to be a valid and enforcea-
ble spendthrift trust, certain common circumstances existed. In
each of these cases, the plan was created and funded by the em-
ployer, and thus by an entity legally and realistically distinct
from the employee; the employee could only withdraw plan ben-
efits upon death, termination of employment, disability, retire-
ment, or plan termination; and none of the facts authorizing
withdrawal had occurred as of the date of the bankruptcy
petition.1
43
140. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 152 comment i (1959); 2 A. SCOTT,
supra note 79, at § 152.3; G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 79, at 404; 90 C.J.S.
Trusts § 194 (1955).
141. See Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1985) (Florida law) (beneficiary of professional corporation retirement plan had sole
authority to amend or terminate the plan); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re
O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67, 76-77 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (Virginia law) (Keogh plan); In re
Gillett, 46 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (Florida law) (close corporation); Bass v.
Shackelford (In re Shackelford), 27 Bankr. 372 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1983) (IRA); Sheehan
v. Sheehan, 90 Misc. 2d 673, 395 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (New York law)
(Keogh plan).
142. See supra Part I(B)(2).
143. See McLean v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund
(In re McLean), 762 F.2d 1204, 1207 (4th Cir. 1985); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Cren-
shaw), 51 Bankr. 554 (N.D. Ala. 1985); In re Elsea, 47 Bankr. 142, 149 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1985) (Tennessee law); Miller v. Jones (In re Jones), 43 Bankr. 1002, 1007 (N.D.
Ind. 1984) (Indiana law); Miller v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. (In re Cook), 43
Bankr. 996, 1001 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (dictum) (Indiana law); Bezanson v. Maine Nat'l Bank
(In re Kwaak), 42 Bank. 599 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (Maine law); Warren v. G.M. Scott &
Sons (In re Phillips), 34 Bankr. 543, 546 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (dictum) (Ohio law); In
re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (Indiana law) (pension portion of sav-
ings and profit-sharing plan); cf. Bakst v. Guernsey (In re Guernsey), 54 Bankr. 68, 69
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One such case is Miller v. Jones (In re Jones). 1 4 The debtor
in Jones was employed by General Electric, which had created
an ERISA pension plan for its employees. General Electric re-
quired employees who participated in the plan to contribute a
fixed percentage of their salaries to it. These employee contribu-
tions were then matched by employer contributions. Plan bene-
fits were payable only upon termination of employment, retire-
ment, death, or disability. None of these events had occurred as
of the date of the petition.
14 5
The debtor claimed her interest in the pension plan was ex-
cluded from the property of the estate under section 541(c)(2)
because it was an enforceable spendthrift trust under Indiana
law. The district court agreed. 14' The court noted first that Indi-
ana generally recognizes the enforceability of spendthrift
trusts.147 Second, the pension fund was not self-settled by the
debtor because her plan contributions were required as a prereq-
uisite to receiving the employer's matching funds. 148 Finally, the
pension plan was not a partial spendthrift trust because it
placed significant restrictions on the debtor's access to the plan
funds. Because "the debtor ha[d] no access to the trust corpus
at this time" and the funds were "not available to this debtor for
current use," the court held that the pension plan constituted a
valid spendthrift trust and was therefore excluded from the
property of the estate.
49
In general, the states have set high standards to govern
whether spendthrift trust property may be kept beyond the
reach of the beneficiary's creditors. Although these standards
mean that many ERISA retirement plans will be included in the
property of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor may nevertheless
claim the property as exempt under state and federal law.1 50
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (Florida law) (employee terminated employment, entitling him to
distribution, but the approval of a committee had neither been requested nor obtained).
144. 43 Bankr. 1002 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
145. Id. at 1004, 1007.
146. Id. at 1007.
147. Id. at 1006.
148. Id. This aspect of the court's opinion is criticized at supra notes 105-06 and
accompanying text.
149. In re Jones, 43 Bankr. at 1007 ("The only way a participant in this plan may
gain access to any portion of the plan is to retire, be terminated, become disabled, or
die.").
150. The exemptions are discussed infra Part II.
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C. The Legal Standard in Chapter 13 Cases
Most of the litigation over whether a debtor's interest in an
ERISA retirement plan is property of the estate has occurred in
the Chapter 7 liquidation contest, in which the property of the
estate is defined by section 541 of the Code. In a consumer plan
case under Chapter 13, the definition of the property of the es-
tate is broader. It includes not only the property specified in sec-
tion 541, but also any additional property of the same kind that
the debtor acquires after filing the petition, but before the case
is closed. 151
Under the legal standard developed in Part I(A), certain
ERISA retirement plans will be excluded from the property of
the estate if they are enforceable as spendthrift trusts under
state law. Although debtors generally prefer that their property
be excluded from the estate, some debtors may want their retire-
ment benefits included in the property of the Chapter 13 es-
tate. 152 Chapter 13 offers debtors a number of advantages over
Chapter 7 liquidation,15 3 but Chapter 13 is available only to in-





Congress intended that Chapter 13 bankruptcy would be
available to those whose sole source of income was retirement
benefits. 15 If a debtor's retirement benefits are not included in
the property of the estate, however, the debtor may not-meet
Chapter 13's "regular income" requirement. A number of courts
have therefore held that the property of the estate in a Chapter
13 case includes property, such as retirement benefits, that
151. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1982). Section 1306(a) provides:
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in sec-
tion 541 of this title-
(1) all property of a kind specified in such section that the debtor ac-
quires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed,
dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title,
whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commence-
ment of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to
a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, whichever occurs first.
See In re Wood, 23 Bankr. 552, 554-55 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
153. See generally J. WHrra BANKRUPTCY AND CREDrroRs' RIGHTS 417-18 (1985).
154. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982). There are a number of other restrictions on the availa-
bility of Chapter 13 relief.
155. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 311-12, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, at 6268-69 (under the "regular income" standard, "individuals on
welfare, social security, fixed pension incomes, or who live on investment incomes" can
take advantage of Chapter 13); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1982); In re
Wood, 23 Bankr. 552, 556 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
FALL 1985]
Journal of Law Reform
would otherwise be excluded under section 541.156 This result is,
however, clearly at odds with the statutory language. The defini-
tion of property of the Chapter 13 estate is limited to property
under section 541, and the property of the same kind acquired
after the filing of the petition.
1 5 7
It is possible to be true to the statutory language and, at the
same time, fulfill Congress's intent that Chapter 13 be available
to those living on retirement benefits. To take advantage of
Chapter 13, the debtor must have a "regular income,"' 58 which is
defined as income that is "sufficiently stable and regular to en-
able such individual to make payments under a plan under
chapter 13." 11,9 An individual receiving retirement benefits has a
stable and regular income; that the income may be derived from
property that is excluded from the property of the estate does
not prevent the debtor from using Chapter 13. If the debtor
wishes to use his retirement benefits to fund a Chapter 13 plan,
and he has no other income, he may "donate" his retirement
benefits to the trustee each month.8 0 If he has other stable
sources of income, he may choose not to use the retirement ben-
efits to fund the Chapter 13 plan.
There is no reason, therefore, why the legal standard gov-
erning the property of the estate should be different in Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 cases. A willing debtor who wants to take ad-
vantage of Chapter 13 may do so, regardless of whether or not
his income from retirement benefits is excluded from the prop-
erty of the estate.
D. Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and the Law of
Creditors' Rights Outside of Bankruptcy
Under the legal standard adopted in Part I(A), ERISA retire-
ment plans would be excluded from the property of the bank-
ruptcy estate only if they are spendthrift trusts under state law.
156. See Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Wood, 23 Bankr. 552
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); see also Note, ERISA Plans as Property of Individuals'
Bankruptcy Estates, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 685 (1984).
157. See supra note 151.
158. See supra text accompanying note 154.
159. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(27) (West Supp. 1985).
160. See McLean v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund
(In re McLean), 762 F.2d 1204, 1208 (4th Cir. 1985); cf. Hildebrand v. Social Sec. Admin.
(In re Buren), 725 F.2d 1080, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984) (social security benefits), cert. denied,
1055 S. Ct. 87 (1984). A debtor may, of course, voluntarily contribute property to the
Chapter 13 estate. See 5 L. KING, supra note 16, at § 1300.90.
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As a result, this standard would permit creditors to reach many
different types of retirement plan benefits in bankruptcy.
Outside of bankruptcy, however, creditors are rarely permitted
to claim ERISA retirement plan benefits.
1. Creditors' rights outside of bankruptcy- ERISA re-
quires, both as a matter of substantive law and as a qualification
for favorable tax status, that all retirement plans require that
plan benefits may not be assigned or alienated by plan partici-
pants.1 61 In addition, ERISA provides that all state laws that
"relate to any employee benefit plan" are preempted by the
Act. 162
The question of whether a creditor has a right, outside of
bankruptcy, to garnish a debtor's interest in an ERISA retire-
ment plan has plagued the courts for years. Given ERISA's re-
strictions on assignment and alienation, and the preemption of
state law, the courts could reach three results. First, ERISA
could have no effect on the state law of creditors' rights. Second,
ERISA could preempt the state law of creditors' rights, and fed-
eral common law could govern the validity of creditors' claims.
Third, ERISA could create a per se federal exemption from
creditor process for all retirement plans. This final interpreta-
tion is the only one that has been generally accepted by the
courts, and appears to be required by Congress's recent amend-
ments to ERISA. 
3
The first position, that ERISA has no effect on the state law
of creditors' rights, rests on the fact that ERISA does not pro-
hibit assignment and alienation. ERISA merely requires that
plans include the assignment and alienation clause. Congress
may have intended to leave the question of the enforceability of
those provisions to state law. Moreover, the state law of credi-
tors' rights has such a tangential effect on retirement plans that
it cannot be said to "relate to" the plans. The state law therefore
is not preempted by ERISA. This position has never garnered
much support. The one court that expounded this view"" cre-
ated questionable precedent in its own jurisdiction,6 6 and al-
161. See supra notes 7-8.
162. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
163. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
164. National Bank of N. Am. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 3, 69
A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127, appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 752, 422 N.Y.S.2d 666
(1979); see also Local 212 v. Local 212 IBEW Credit Union, 549 F. Supp. 1299, 1302
(S.D. Ohio 1982) (dictum), afl'd per curiam, 735 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1984).
165. A subsequent appellate court decision questioned the holding of National Bank
of N. Am., and was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v.
Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780-81 (1980), afl'd, 52 N.Y.2d 984, 438
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most certainly has been overruled by the 1984 ERISA
amendments.'66
The second position is that Congress intended that ERISA
preempt the state law of creditors' rights, and that the courts
develop federal common law, similar to state spendthrift trust
law, to govern whether and in what circumstances the restric-
tions on assignment and alienation would be enforceable against
creditors. Although several commentators have advocated this
position, no court has yet adopted it.' 67 It too appears not to be
a viable interpretation in light of the recent ERISA
amendments.
The final position, that ERISA creates a per se federal exemp-
tion from creditor process outside of bankruptcy, has received
the support of a majority of courts.166 Although many courts
have also recognized an implied exception to the per se exemp-
tion in the case of family support claims,6 9 this conclusion is
reached as a matter of statutory interpretation 17 0 and is not evi-
dence of federal common law in this area.
1 71
According to the majority of courts, therefore, ERISA's re-
striction on assignment and alienation of plan benefits, in con-
junction with its sweeping preemption of state law, demon-
strates that Congress intended that creditors could never reach a
plan participant's interest, unless the creditor is seeking to sat-
N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981).
166. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
167. The best example of the broad potential reach of the federal common law posi-
tion is illustrated in Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem
of Creditors' Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247 (1980). Professor Sherman argues that Congress
intended the courts to create federal common law, along the lines of state spendthrift
trust law, to govern the enforceability of plan restrictions on assignment and alienation.
168. See, e.g., Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983) (qualified
thrift and stock ownership plan); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) (vacation trust fund), vacated, 463 U.S. 1 (1983);
General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mortgage Ins.,
Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (qualified pension and
profit-sharing plans).
169. See, e.g., Operating Engineers' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981); Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.
1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979). But see General
Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
With the enactment of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-379, 98
Stat. 1426, Congress codified and preempted this judicially created exception. See infra
notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 169.
171. But see Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 Bankr. 181, 189-90 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1984) (exception for family support claims suggests that "the federal courts are develop-
ing a federal common law to govern" the exemption from creditors).
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isfy a family support obligation. A typical example of this princi-
ple is found in Commercial Mortgage Insurance, Inc. v. Citizens
National Bank of Dallas,17 in which a judgment creditor sought
to garnish a doctor's interest in tax-qualified pension and profit-
sharing plans. The plans had been established by the doctor's
professional association, of which he was the sole director and
sole shareholder at the time of the garnishment action. The doc-
tor had an eighty percent interest in the $127,000 held in the
two plans. 17 3 Although the plans were unenforceable self-settled
trusts under Texas law, the district court held that the creditor
could not garnish any of the plan assets.17' The court concluded
that ERISA created a per se federal exemption for all ERISA
retirement plans, and the court refused to create federal com-
mon law to govern the enforceability of the plan restrictions.'"
The Commercial Mortgage Insurance case has been widely fol-
lowed by state and federal courts.
1 78
The conclusion that ERISA created a per se federal exemp-
tion outside of bankruptcy is bolstered by the recent enactment
of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA).'7 REA creates a
single, express exception to the general rule that plan benefits
may not be assigned or alienated: if the court order to pay plan
benefits to a participant's creditor is a "qualified domestic rela-
tions order," then the order will not violate the general spend-
thrift restrictions.7 8 In addition, Congress amended the ERISA
provision preempting state law to permit courts to issue quali-
fied domestic relations orders.
1 79
The explicit exception for qualified domestic relations orders
suggests that Congress intended that ERISA would preempt all
other orders, such as garnishment and attachment orders. The
Senate report states: "[The] conforming changes to the ERISA
preemption provision are necessary to ensure that only those or-
ders that are excepted from the spendthrift provisions are not
preempted by ERISA." 180 In addition, Congress's purpose in en-
172. 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
173. Id. at 513-14.
174. Id. at 523.
175. Id. at 516.
176. See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 678 F.2d 688, 689-90 (4th
Cir. 1983); Citizens Bank of Ashburn v. Shingler, 173 Ga. App. 511, 511, 326 S.E.2d 861,
862 (1985).
177. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
178. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 401(a)(13)(B), 414(p) (West Supp. 1985); ERISA § 206(d)(2), 29
U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
179. ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(7) (West Supp. 1985).
180. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2547, 2565.
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acting the elaborate provisions defining qualified domestic rela-
tions orders would be undermined if "unqualified" orders were
not preempted.1 81
The inescapable conclusion is that Congress intended that
ERISA preempt the state law of creditors' rights and that there
be a per se exemption for ERISA retirement plans. There is no
evidence that Congress supported the creation of federal com-
mon law to govern creditors' rights in the nonbankruptcy
context.
2. Conflict with the treatment of ERISA retirement plans in
bankruptcy- Under the legal standard recommended in Part
I(A), ERISA retirement plans would only be excluded from the
property of the estate if they are enforceable as spendthrift
trusts under applicable state law. This legal standard creates an
inconsistency between the treatment of ERISA plans in and
outside of bankruptcy. In Commercial Mortgage Insurance,
18 2
the doctor was granted a per se exemption from garnishment in
a nonbankruptcy proceeding, even though he owed a $250,000
judgment and held almost $100,000 in his plans. 8a In the bank-
ruptcy context, however, the same plans would certainly be
characterized as self-settled spendthrift trusts, and the entire
fund would be included in the property of the estate and distrib-
uted to the creditors.
84
There is no statement in either the legislative history of
ERISA or the Bankruptcy Code that suggests Congress intended
that creditors' rights to ERISA retirement plans should turn on
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Because bankruptcy is in
some sense simply another creditors' remedy, 8 ' the inconsis-
tency between the treatment of ERISA plans in bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy is troubling. 86 This inconsistency is not, how-
181. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 414(p) (West Supp. 1985); ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1056(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
183. Commercial Mortgage Insurance, 526 F. Supp. at 512-14.
184. See supra Part I(B)(2).
185. Three creditors can force a debtor into bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1985).
186. See J. WHrrE, supra note 153, at 508-09.
It has also been argued that different treatment in bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
would frustrate Congress's intent to establish uniform regulation of employee benefit
plans. See Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 Bankr. 181, 191 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984)
(Some courts have concluded that "although Congress had created a general federal ex-
emption for pensions and eliminated the effect of state attachment and exemption stat-
utes on pensions in 1974, Congress chose in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 to revive the
effect of state attachment and exemption statutes on pensions. This court finds this very
unlikely in view of the great importance which the legislature had seen in relieving pen-
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ever, so absurd1 87 as to require a different result in either
situation.
88
It is unfortunate that there is not a rational explanation for
the inconsistent treatment of ERISA plans. One suspects that
Congress has never focused its attention on the problem, and
that the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy rules were developed in
isolation from each other. If Congress were presented, for exam-
ple, with Commercial Mortgage Insurance, the inequities of a
per se exemption outside of bankruptcy would be readily appar-
sion plans from state regulation."); Note, supra note 156, at 706 (reliance on state spend-
thrift trust law to determine the property of the estate "contravenes, at least in spirit,
ERISA's intended preemption of state law."). Congress's general intent to preempt all
state law relating to pension plans should not, however, override Congress's specific in-
tent to limit the exclusion of ERISA retirement plans in bankruptcy. See supra Part
I(A).
187. Statutes should be construed so as to avoid "absurd" results. See, e.g. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27
(1948).
188. There are two possible explanations for the inconsistency between bankruptcy
and nonbankruptcy treatment of ERISA retirement plans. First, both ERISA and bank-
ruptcy are congressionally created rights, and each right is subject to certain restrictions.
As one bankruptcy court has noted, "[it is neither illogical nor inequitable that Con-
gress may require an otherwise nonassignable or nontransferable Congressionally created
right to become an asset of the debtor's estate in order for the holder of that right to
take advantage of another Congressionally created right-bankruptcy." Clotfelter v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434, 437 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 24
Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982); cf. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) (not illogical
that Consumer Credit Protection Act limits wage garnishment in the nonbankruptcy, but
not bankruptcy, setting); In re Ridenour, 45 Bankr. 72, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984);
BANKRUPTCY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 45, at 197 (recommending that spendthrift
trust provisions be enforceable in bankruptcy only to the extent reasonably necessary for
support because "[there is no sound justification for permitting a debtor to take advan-
tage of the Bankruptcy Act and, at the same time, to shield from his creditors assets
because local law does not allow creditors to reach his interest.").
Second, ERISA itself resolves the conflict between its provisions and those of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 514(d) states: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the United States
. . . or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982). In
light of the strong congressional policy of excluding from the property of the estate only
those trusts that are enforceable spendthrift trusts, ERISA's assignment and alienation
restrictions cannot be used to exclude from the property of the estate that which would
otherwise be included. ERISA's exemption of plans from creditor process in the
nonbankruptcy context should have no effect on the status of those plans in bankruptcy.
See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 588 n.38 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Ridenour, 45
Bankr. 72, 77-78 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re
Threewitt), 20 Bankr. 434, 437 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan.
1982); In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515, 518 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983); Samore v. Graham (In
re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th
Cir. 1984); Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 Bankr. 412, 417 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981) (Bankruptcy Act case); cf. National Stabilization Agreement of Sheet Metal Indus.
Trust Fund v. Commercial Roofing and Sheet Metal, 655 F.2d 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Labor-Management Relations Act); Bonin v. American Airlines, 621 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.
1980) (Railway Labor Act).
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ent.189 Congress should act to remove the inconsistency between
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy treatment of ERISA retirement
plans.
II. ERISA RETIREMENT PLANS AS EXEMPT FROM THE
BANKRUPTcY ESTATE
If the debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan is in-
cluded in the property of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor may
nevertheless claim it as exempt. Under section 522, an individual
debtor in a bankruptcy case is offered a choice between exemp-
tion systems. The debtor may choose the federal Code exemp-
tions, which are specified in section 522(d)), 1e0 or he may choose
the state and federal non-Code exemptions, which are a combi-
nation of state exemptions and federal exemptions outside of
bankruptcy. 191 The federal non-Code exemptions are unavailable
to a debtor who chooses the federal Code exemption scheme. 2
Also, the federal Code exemption scheme is unavailable to a
debtor whose state has opted out of the federal scheme. 193 The
debtor may, of course, claim the federal non-Code exemptions
even in those states that have opted out.1
The applicability of the federal Code exemptions to ERISA
retirement plans is discussed in Part II(B). Part II(A) discusses
whether such plans are exempt under the federal non-Code ex-
emptions, and it is concluded that they are not exempt. A
debtor who seeks to exempt an interest in an ERISA retirement
189. See, e.g., supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
190. 11 U.C.S.A. § 522(b)(1), (d) (West Supp. 1985).
191. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
192. See In re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 1984); S. REP. No. 989, supra note
17, at 75, reprinted in 1978 CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5861; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 17, at 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6316; 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 522(b) (West Supp. 1985) (debtor may claim exemptions under subsection (d), or "in
the alternative," exemptions under state and federal non-Code law). But see Goff v. Tay-
lor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 547, 582 n.22 (5th Cir. 1983) (dictum) ("both federal and state
electors are granted the exemption benefits of these [federal non-Code] laws").
193. 11 U.S.C.A.. § 522(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985); 3 L. KING, supra note 16, at
§ 522.02.
194. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985) (in states that have opted out of
the federal exemption scheme, debtors may exempt "any property that is exempt under
Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law . . .") (em-
phasis added); 3 L. KING, supra note 16, at § 522.21; Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d
574, 579 n.12 (5th Cir. 1983). But see Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Di
Piazza), 29 Bankr. 916, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (implying that because Illinois has




plan under the state and federal non-Code exemption system
must employ a state law exemption. 195
A. ERISA Retirement Plans As Exempt Under "Federal
[Nonbankruptcy] Law"
Under section 522(b)(2)(A), the debtor who chooses the state
and federal non-Code exemptions may exempt from the prop-
erty of the estate "any property that is exempt under Federal
law, other than subsection (d) of this section [(the federal Code
exemptions)], or State or local law that is applicable ... ."le If
ERISA is a "Federal [nonbankruptcy] law" within the meaning
of section 522(b)(2)(A), then all ERISA retirement plans would
presumably be exempt from the bankruptcy estate. The major-
ity of the few courts that have considered whether ERISA is
such a federal nonbankruptcy law have concluded that it is
not.19 7 This result is consistent with the legislative history and
policies of the Code.
1. The statutory language- The language of section
522(b)(2)(A) is cryptic. It allows a debtor to exempt from the
bankruptcy estate property that is "exempt" under federal
nonbankruptcy law. The obvious question is, "Exempt from
what?" The section could be referring to federal laws that ex-
empt property from the claims of: both the trustee in bank-
ruptcy and the creditors outside of bankruptcy; just the trustee;
just the creditors; or either the trustee or the creditors. 9 8 If the
195. Several states exempt private retirement plans. See, e.g. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 704.115 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110, § 12-1001 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 8124 (Purdon Supp. 1985); see generally 7 L. KING, supra note 16.
196. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
197. See Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1985); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985);
Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co.
(In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); In re Gillett, 46 Bankr. 642 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1985); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 44 Bankr. 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 51 Bankr. 554 (N.D. Ala. 1985); Nixon v. P.J. Pedone &
Co. (In re Nichols), 42 Bankr. 772 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); In re La Fata, 41 Bankr. 842
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Note, supra note 31, at 1129-31.
Contra Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); Note,
supra note 8; Comment, supra note 31, at 1070-71.
198. The legislative history implies that the lost interpretation was intended. The
House and Senate committee reports list a number of illustrative federal statutes
thought to fall within § 522(b)(2)(A). See infra notes 202, 208. These statutes typically
provide that certain property shall not be subject to execution, levy, attachment, gar-
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section refers to only those federal nonbankruptcy statutes that
specifically state that the funds may not be reached by the trus-
tee in bankruptcy, the section would not apply to ERISA.
ERISA's assignment and alienation restrictions make no men-
tion of bankruptcy or insolvency law.199
Apart from the ambiguities of the Bankruptcy Code, there are
indications in the text of ERISA itself that suggest that it was
not intended to create an exemption under section 522(b)(2)(A).
ERISA provides that it should not be construed to "alter,
amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede" any other fed-
eral law.200 If ERISA is construed to be a federal nonbankruptcy
law within the meaning of section 522(b)(2)(A), it would have
the effect of modifying the set of exemptions already established
by the Bankruptcy Code. By ERISA's own terms, this construc-
tion must be avoided.
Although the statutory language of the Code and ERISA sup-
port the conclusion that ERISA is not a federal nonbankruptcy
law under section 522(b)(2)(A), there is sufficient ambiguity
about this issue that it is appropriate to examine the legislative
history of section 522(b)(2)(A). 0 1
2. The legislative history of section 522(b)(2)(A)- The leg-
islative history of section 522(b)(2)(A) reveals that Congress in-
tended that ERISA not create a federal nonbankruptcy law ex-
emption. ERISA is noticeably absent from a list of illustrative
statutes contained in the legislative history. In addition, ERISA
is substantively very different from the narrow class of statutes
included in the list. Congress appears to have made a conscious
decision to exclude ERISA from section 522(b)(2)(A).
a. The failure to list ERISA as an illustrative statute- The
House and Senate reports list a number of federal statutes that
Congress intended to include within section 522(b)(2)(A)20
nishment, or other legal process. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4060 (1982) (Foreign Service Re-
tirement and Disability Benefits). Two of these statutes, however, explicitly exempt
property from, among other things, "the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law."
42 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) (social security payments); 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1982) (injury or
death compensation from war risk hazards). See In re Stewart, 32 Bankr. 132, 138
(Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
199. See supra notes 7-8.
200. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982); see supra note 188.
201. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
202. According to the House report:
[S]ome of the items that may be exempted under other Federal laws include:
- Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104;
- Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407;
- Illness or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1717;
[VOL. 19:1
FALL 1985] Individual Bankruptcy
ERISA is absent from these lists. Although the lists were not
intended to be exclusive,0 3 there are a number of reasons to be-
lieve that Congress's failure to include ERISA demonstrates its
intent that ERISA was not within the federal non-Code
exemptions.
ERISA was enacted in 1974. It imposed comprehensive regula-
tion on private employee benefit plans and was subject to a
great deal of congressional and public debate.20 4 The new Bank-
ruptcy Code, including section 522(b)(2)(A), was enacted only
four years later. Congress was undoubtedly aware of ERISA and
its provisions because, in another subsection of section 522 of
the Code, Congress specifically referred to ERISA. °6
Congress could not have simply forgotten to mention ERISA
in the illustrative list of statutes.20 6 As one court has indicated,
"Given the extensive and general reach of ERISA-qualified
plans, it is highly improbable that Congress intended their inclu-
sion without mention in the section 522(b)(2)(A) exemption in
the midst of a listing of significantly less well-known
statutes.
20 7
- Wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. § 601;
- Civil Service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. §§ 729, 2265;
- Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability
benefits, 33 U.S.C. § 916;
- Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. § 228(L);
- Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C.. § 352(E) [38 U.S.C. § 770(b)];
- Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38
U.S.C. § 3101'; and
- Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent,
43 U.S.C. § 1755.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws,
at 6316; see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 17, at 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 5861.
203. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 6316 ("some of the items that may be exempted... include") (emphasis
added).
204. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981); Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980); Lichstrahl v. Bankers
Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff),
706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983).
205. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (iii) (1982) (cited infra note 220); Lichstrahl v.
Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Goff v. Taylor (In
re Goff), 706 F.2d at 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17,
at 455, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6411.
206. One commentator has pointed to citation errors in the illustrative list of statutes
as evidence that "the list was not painstakingly drafted," and that "Congress overlooked
(ERISA]." Note, supra note 8, at 223. The citation errors are minor, however, and do not
adequately explain the complete absence of a statute as important as ERISA. See infra
note 207 and accompanying text.
207. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Lichstrahl
v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Rodgers v.
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b. Dissimilarity between ERISA and the listed statutes-
Further evidence that Congress did not intend that ERISA be
included within the "federal [nonbankruptcy] law[s]" specified
in section 522(b)(2)(A) is the dissimilarity between ERISA and
the statutes listed in the legislative history. Specifically, ERISA
differs from the listed statutes in the type of property exempted
from the creditor process.2 08 Although the statutes all refer to
Norman (In re Crenshaw), 44 Bankr. 30, 33 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 51 Bankr. 554 (N.D. Ala. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr.
305, 311-12 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984). In one
bankruptcy court case, In re La Fata, 41 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), the court
remarked that Goff and Graham "have relied heavily upon Congress' failure to specify
ERISA plans as falling within property exempt under federal law. Too much reliance has
been placed upon that congressional silence." Id. at 843. The court ultimately ruled,
however, that ERISA is not a federal nonbankruptcy exemption statute within the
meaning of § 522(b)(2)(A). The court felt constrained by the two court of appeals deci-
sions. See id. at 843.
208. Courts and litigants have suggested four other ways in which ERISA is different
from the listed statutes, but none is particularly persuasive. First, one court has argued
that ERISA only requires that plans include the alienation and assignment restrictions
in ERISA retirement plans. The listed statutes, in contrast, directly preclude assignment
and alienation as a matter of federal law. See Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24
Bankr. 305, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), a/I'd, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); see also
supra Part I(D). The relevant language from each of the statutes listed in the legislative
history is as follows: 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (now codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4060 (1982)) ("None of
the moneys ... shall be assignable ... or subject to execution, levy, attachment, gar-
nishment, or other legal process . . ."); 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) ("The right ... to any
future payment. . . shall not be transferable or assignable. . . and none of the moneys
* * . shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process,
or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law."); 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1982) (same
wording); 46 U.S.C. § 601 ("No wages. . . shall be subject to attachment..."); 5 U.S.C.
88 729, 2265 (now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (1982)) ("The money [covered herein] is
not assignable ... or subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process . . ."); 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1982) ("No assignment, release, or commutation of com-
pensation or benefits. . . shall be valid, and such compensation or benefits shall be ex-
empt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and attachment or other
remedy for recovery or collection of a debt. . ."); 45 U.S.C. § 228(1) (now codified at 45
U.S.C. § 231m (1982)) ("Notwithstanding any other [federal or state law], no annuity or
pension payment shall be assignable or be subject to ... garnishment, attachment, or
other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever. . ."); 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1982)
(same wording); 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982) ("Payment of benefits ... shall not be assigna-
ble ... and . . . shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to
attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever .... ");
43 U.S.C. § 175 (repealed 1976) ("No [homestead] lands ... shall in any event become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of a patent
therefor.").
The argument advanced by the Graham bankruptcy court fails to recognize the
ERISA provisions are intended to preempt the state law of creditors' rights applicable to
employee benefit plans. See supra Part I(D). ERISA, therefore, has the effect of directly
precluding assignment and alienation and is indistinguishable from the listed statutes in
that regard. See Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 Bankr. 181, 189 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1984).
Second, some litigants have apparently suggested that ERISA differs from the listed
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pensions, wages, and benefits, ERISA alone relates to private
pension benefits. The listed statutes, in contrast, deal with pub-
licly funded or created pension and welfare systems, and a few
industries the federal government traditionally protects.20 9 This
suggests that Congress did not intend to exempt private pension
plan benefits, such as ERISA benefits, from the creditors in
bankruptcy.
Congress's intent to exempt only publicly funded or created
pension and welfare systems, as revealed by the illustrative list
of statutes, is consistent with the practice of the majority of the
states. Roughly thirty states have enacted statutes that exempt
public employee retirement systems from the claims of the bene-
ficiary's creditors, without also enacting statutes exempting pri-
vate retirement benefits. 10 The rationale for this distinction is
that future pension payments from a public retirement system
"are not vested contractual rights but mere bounties conferred
out of gratitude by a benevolent government, subject to reduc-
statutes in the explicitness with which they prohibit creditor process. ERISA, although
less explicit than some of the listed statutes, is more explicit than others. See Goff v.
Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 n.28 (5th Cir. 1983); Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hin-
shaw), 23 Bankr. 233, 235 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). Compare ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) (1982) ("Each [ERISA] pension plan shall provide that benefits provided
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.") with 46 U.S.C. § 601 (1982) ("No
wages [of fishermen, seamen or apprentices] ... shall be subject to attachment .... ").
Third, it has been suggested that ERISA merely "encourages" the inclusion of the "no
assignment or alienation" clauses, while the listed statutes directly preclude assignment
and alienation. See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983). This is
factually incorrect, however, because ERISA requires that all employers and employee
organizations operating in interstate commerce must include these clauses in their em-
ployee pension. plans, unless the plan is established by a self-employed individual who
has no employees. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
Finally, one court has argued that the listed statutes exempt only present periodic
payments and that ERISA differs because it exempts future payments. See Parkinson v.
Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 Bankr. 67, 79 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985). The court's
distinction is invalid because one of the listed statutes expressly exempts both present
and future payments. See 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1982):
The right of any person to any future payment [of social security benefits] shall
not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys
paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to exe-
cution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation
of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
209. See Lichstrahl v. Bankers (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir.
1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v.
Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 586 & nn.31-32.
210. See 7 L. KING, supra note 16, passim (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Col-
orado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming).
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tion or abolition by subsequent legislation."' 211 As a result, credi-
tors have no right to complain if the state or Congress chooses to
exempt the benefits from the creditors' claims in bankruptcy. In
contrast, "[p]rivate pension plans for employees more often have
a contractual base. ' 212 Congress and the majority of states have
decided that, unlike the case of public employee pensions, it
would be unfair to deny the creditors a share of the private pen-
sion benefits, because the benefits are more clearly a vested
property interest of the debtor.2"'
Although the language and legislative history of section
522(b)(2)(A) demonstrate that Congress did not intend to in-
clude ERISA as an exempting statute, this conclusion is
strengthened by an examination of the policies of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
3. The policies of the Bankruptcy Code- The debtor who
chooses the federal exemption scheme discussed in Part II(B)
can only exempt his interest in a retirement plan to the extent
"reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor."2 " Con-
gress included this limitation "because of the well-known fact
that a corporate officer or a member of a professional corpora-
tion may be entitled to vested pension benefits aggregating hun-




If section 522(b)(2)(A) is construed to include ERISA, a
debtor who chooses the state and federal non-Code exemption
scheme would be able to exempt all the funds in any ERISA
retirement plan, without limitation.21 6 It is illogical to suppose
that Congress, after making a deliberate policy choice to limit
the exemption of private retirement benefits under the federal
exemption scheme, would simultaneously grant an unlimited ex-
emption under the state and federal non-Code exemption
scheme.217 It is more likely that Congress intended that the
211. Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 54-55 (1975); see also 4A J.
MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70.22[21 (14th ed. 1978).
212. Plumb, supra note 211, at 55.
213. But see Note, supra note 8, at 231-33; Countryman, For a New Exemption Pol-
icy in Bankruptcy, 14 RutraGEs 678, 740 (1960) (discussing § 6 of the Bankruptcy Act,
which is similar too § 522(bb)(2)(A) of the new Code).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982); see infra note 220.
215. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1984); see
Plumb, supra note 211, at 59.
216. Cf. In re La Fats, 41 Bankr. 842, 844 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (implying that
there is presently no "reasonably necessary for support limitation" on § 522(b)(2)(A)
elections).
217. One may argue that the unlimited exemption of benefits under other federal
laws besides ERISA, see supra note 202, is equally inconsistent with Congress's intent to
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states would provide an exemption to the extent they thought
appropriate.218
In summary, Congress did not intend that a debtor who
chooses the state and federal non-Code exemption system
should be able to exempt his interest in an ERISA retirement
plan under the federal nonbankruptcy law exemption. He should
only be permitted to exempt his interest to the extent that it is
exempt under applicable state or local law.2 19
B. ERISA Retirement Plans as Exempt to the Extent
Reasonably Necessary for the Support of the Debtor
If the debtor chooses the federal Code exemption scheme, he
may exempt his "right to receive . . . a payment under a stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or con-
tract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of ser-
vice, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor" under section
522(d)(10)(E). 220 Three issues are presented when a debtor seeks
limit benefits to the extent reasonably necessary for support. There is no reason to be-
lieve, however, that the federal welfare and pension benefits provided under the statutes
listed in the legislative history are in any way excessive. These benefits would surely
never reach "hundreds of thousands of dollars."
218. An unlimited exemption for ERISA retirement plan benefits under
§ 522(b)(2)(A) would also be inconsistent with the general purpose of the bankruptcy
exemptions. The exemptions are designed to leave the debtor with just enough assets to
make a fresh start, so that he is not left destitute after bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Rich-
ard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 828 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10
Bankr. 101, 106 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). In light of these purposes, it is difficult to be-
lieve that Congress intended to grant an automatic exemption for retirement plans that
could hold several hundred thousand dollars.
219. See supra note 195.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982). This section reads in relevant part:
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this
section:
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or
similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or
length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an
insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under
such plan or contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a),
403(b), 408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.
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to apply this exemption to his interest in an ERISA retirement
plan. First, if the debtor is not presently receiving payments
from the plan on the date of the bankruptcy petition, some
courts have contended that he has no "right to receive a pay-
ment" and therefore may not exempt any part of his interest.
Second, if the debtor has a right to receive a payment, the court
must determine whether the payment is "under a stock bonus,
pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on
account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service."
Third, the court must undertake the difficult task of determin-
ing what is "reasonably necessary for the support" of the debtor
and his dependents.
1. The debtor's right to receive a payment- If a benefit is
currently in pay status under an ERISA retirement plan, or the
debtor has received plan benefits prior to the filing of the peti-
tion, then he clearly has a "right to receive a payment." The
courts have agreed that the debtor may exempt both the present
payment stream 21 and any prior disbursement,222 subject only
to the "reasonably necessary for support" limitation.
When a benefit is not in pay status and the debtor is not seek-
ing an exemption for a prior disbursement, several courts have
held that the debtor's future right to receive payments from a
retirement plan is not exempt under section 522(d)(10)(E), even
§§ 401(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
221. See In re Bari, 43 Bankr. 253 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (disability income; Minne-
sota exemptions analogous to § 522(d)(10)(E)); Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr.
101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (retiree's pension payments are exempt, but only to the ex-
tent reasonably necessary for support); cf. Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert Clark), 711 F.2d
21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983) (dictum) ("The exemption of present Keogh payments, to the ex-
tent they are necessary for the support of the debtor, is consistent with [Congress's goal
of giving debtors a fresh start].").
222. See In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). A retired debtor re-
ceived a lump-sum distribution from a pension fund three weeks before filing bank-
ruptcy petition. Although the debtor no longer had a "right to receive a payment," the
court held that "[tihe identifiable sum . . . is a tangible reflection of 'the debtor's right
to receive. . . a payment'" within the language and spirit of § 522(d)(10)(E). Id. at 680.
No court has addressed the Donaghy holding, but it would appear to be inconsistent
with Congress's exemption, in another subsection of § 522(d), of "the debtor's right to
receive, or property that is traceable to" various other payments. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)
(1982) (emphasis added). Congress's failure to use this phrase in § 522(d)(10)(E) suggests
that traceable retirement-benefits already paid to the debtor could not be exempted. See
Plumb, supra note 211, at 558 (exemption for "rights . . . under a . . . plan," rather
than "benefits" suggests that it "will not exempt any pension payments or lump sum
distributions already in the hands of the debtor"); Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption
Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REv. 769, 778 (1980) (same). But
see Dunham, Tracing the Proceeds of Exempt Assets in Bankruptcy and Non-
bankruptcy Cases, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 317, 343.
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though it may be reasonably necessary for his support.22 These
courts have offered two arguments to justify this result, but
neither is persuasive.
First, the courts have relied on the "literal" language of sec-
tion 522(d)(10)(E). Because the debtor does not, on the date of
the petition, have an unrestricted right2 24 to receive payments
from the plan, he cannot claim an exemption for a "right to re-
ceive payments," which is interpreted by these courts as encom-
passing only present rights to payment. 25  The statutory lan-
guage, however, is broad enough to cover both present and
future interests. The debtor's right to receive payment in the fu-
ture, whether vested or contingent, is a right that has a present
existence. The enjoyment of the right is merely postponed.226
Therefore, a debtor has a "right to receive a payment" within
the literal terms of section 522(d)(10)(E) even though the bene-
fit is not in pay status.
223. A number of courts have held that a debtor who does not have an unrestricted
right to compel payment under an ERISA retirement plan on the date of the petition
may not claim an exemption for his interest under § 522(d)(10)(E). See Clark v. O'Neill
(In re Robert Clark), 711 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983) (Keogh plan, 10% penalty tax for pre-
mature distributions); In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982)
(same); cf. Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) (IRA fund,
10% penalty tax for premature distributions) (interpreting South Carolina exemption
similar to § 522(d)(10)(E)).
The majority of courts have, however, ignored the issue. These courts have examined
plans in light of the "reasonably necessary for support" limitation, even though the ben-
efit was not in pay status. See In re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Grant, 40
Bankr. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Sheridan, 38 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983);
In re Johnson, 36 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984); In re Kenneth Miller, 33 Bankr. 549
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
224. Two courts have held that a 10% tax penalty for a withdrawal of funds prior to
retirement supports a finding that the debtor does not have a "right to receive a pay-
ment" from the plan. See Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert Clark), 711 F.2d 21 (3d Cir.
1983) (Keogh plan); Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982)
(interpreting South Carolina exemption similar to § 522(d)(10)(E)). But see Comment,
Bankruptcy-Section 522(d)(1O)(E), 29 ViLL. L. REv. 831, 852 (1984) (financial penalty
does not affect right to receive payment).
225. See Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 22 (3d Cir. 1983) (bank-
ruptcy court below held that because the debtor does not have a present right to receive
payments from his Keogh plan, "his exemption claim did not fall within the literal terms
of section 522(d)(10)(E)"); In re Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 829 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) ("At the present time [the debtor] is receiving no payments under the plan. Thus,
the court is not required to determine whether payments are 'necessary for the support
of the debtor.' "); cf. Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982)
(intepreting South Carolina exemption similar to § 522(d)(10)(E)) ("As [the debtor] was
due no payment from the I.R.A. as of the moment of filing his petition for relief, he is
provided no exemption ... in the funds in the account."). There is some support in the
legislative history for this literal reading of § 522(d)(10)(E). See Clark v. O'Neill, 711
F.2d at 24 (Beccker, J., concurring).
226. See L. Simxs & A. SMrrH, THE LAW OF FuTuRrE INTERESTS § 65 (2d ed. 1956).
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Second, the courts have argued that the policies of section
522(d)(10)(E) would be frustrated if it exempted future benefit
payments to a debtor whose benefits are not presently in pay
status. The purpose of section 522(d) is said to provide the
debtor with a "fresh start," and to alleviate present rather than
long-term need. 2 If the benefit is not in pay status, one court
has held, "the exemption of future payments . . . demonstrates
a concern for the debtor's long-term security which is absent
from the statute.
22 8
Assuming, arguendo, that Congress was concerned only with
the debtor's present needs, the bright-line "pay status" test
adopted by these courts could frustrate that purpose. If a
debtor, not in pay status, filed a bankruptcy petition a few days
before his benefit was to enter pay status, the debtor's "future"
right to payment may be absolutely necessary to provide for
what are in essence "present needs" and a fresh start. The ap-
proach that would best implement Congress's intent would be to
allow the debtor to exempt his interest in an ERISA retirement
plan, whether the benefit is in pay status or not. Then if the
benefit is not in pay status, that could be used as a factor in
determining whether the benefits are "reasonably necessary for
his support.
'229
The courts should therefore adopt the rule that a debtor may
exempt his "right to receive a payment" under his retirement
plan, whether the benefit is in pay status or not. The issue is
then what exactly the debtor may exempt. Section 522(d)(10)(E)
refers to a "payment." There is some authority for the proposi-
tion that the debtor may exempt only the payment stream, and
not the principal.23 0 The better view is that both periodic pay-
227. See Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983); In re
Richard Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 828-29 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
228. Clark v. O'Neill (In re Robert Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis in
original).
229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
230. Cf. In re Kitson, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) § 70,120 at 86,084 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
Oct. 5, 1984) (interpreting an Illinois exemption for the debtor's right to receive "a pay-
ment under any pension plans") ("[Tihe 'payment' is what can be exempt, not the asset
itself .... There is no provision in the Illinois law ... for the exemption of the entire
asset [an IRA]."). Kitson is questionable authority, however. The debtor was not due to
receive a disbursement from his IRA, so the case is identical to the "pay status" cases
criticized supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text. In addition, the Kitson court cited
Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982), see 3 BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) at 86,084, which was clearly decided under the "pay status" rationale. See supra
note 223. It is possible, therefore, that the court believed the IRA was not exempt be-
cause the debtor had no "right to receive" a payment, rather than because the debtor
was requesting exemption of an "asset," not a "payment."
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ments and principal are exempt to the extent reasonably neces-
sary for support. The principal of the retirement plan will even-
tually be distributed in the form of "payments," either
periodically or in a lump sum, during the plan participant's re-
tirement. Therefore, the entire asset must be exempt in order to
exempt the "payments."
2. The nature of the retirement plan- To qualify for the
exemption under section 522(d)(10)(E), the debtor's right to re-
ceive a payment must be "under a stock bonus, pension, profit-
sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of ill-
ness, disability, death, age, or length of service."231 The legisla-
tive history of section 522(d)(10)(E) refers to "benefits akin to
the future earnings of the debtor."23 2 One court has held that
the exemption does not apply to a retirement plan that does not
have stringent restrictions on withdrawal before retirement.2"'
Because there was no guarantee that the funds would be used
solely for retirement purposes, the court denied the exemption
because the funds were not "akin to future earnings."
A rule that denies a debtor the section 522(d)(10)(E) exemp-
tion for retirement plans from which he has a present right to
withdraw funds would mean that Individual Retirement Ac-
counts (IRAs) 234 would never be exempt in bankruptcy under
the federal Code exemptions.2 35 This result is, however, difficult
to square with the statutory language. Section 522(d)(10)(E)
provides that the retirement plan exemption will not apply
when, among other things, the plan does not meet the require-
231. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982).
232. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 362, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 6318.
233. See In re Pauquette, 38 Bankr. 170, 174 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (Individual Retire-
ment Annuities) ("[W]here account funds may be withdrawn at any time by the contract
holder, even if any early assessment is an incident of the early withdrawal, the courts
have unanimously rejected a claim of exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E)."). Of the seven
cases cited for this "unanimous" proposition, five did not even involve § 522(d)(10)(E).
See In re Berndt, 34 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983); In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. 621
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); In re Talbert, 15 Bankr. 536 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981); In re
Macee, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1978); In re Brown, 2 BANKR. CT.
DEC. (CRR) 1661 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1976). In the other two cases, Clark v. O'Neill (In re
Robert Clark), 711 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983), and Hovis v. Lowe (In re Lowe), 25 Bankr. 86
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1982), the courts held § 522(d)(10)(E) to be inapplicable to the retire-
ment plan because the debtors had insignificant, rather than excessive, control over the
plan funds. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 11. The textual discussion of IRAs is equally applicable to Indi-
vidual Retirement Annuities (IRANs).
235. IRAs permit withdrawal of funds prior to age 591/2 for any reason, subject only
to a 10% tax penalty. See 26 U.S.C. § 408(f) (1982).
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ments of an IRA.236 If Congress had intended that IRAs would
never be exempt, it would be superfluous to require, as a condi-
tion for disqualification from the exemption, that the plan not
be an IRA."3 7
As in the case of the pay status test, this "access and control"
test adopted by the court draws an inappropriately bright line
for application of the section 522(d)(10)(E) exemption. A debtor
may file a bankruptcy petition a few days before retirement, and
his only retirement funds may be his IRA and social security.
Although he may "withdraw funds at any time before retire-
ment" and "there is no guarantee these funds will actually be
available for retirement purposes," that line of reasoning ignores
the reality of the situation. The better view is that if the debtor
has an interest in a retirement plan, that interest should be ex-
empt to the extent reasonably necessary for support. 38 If the
retirement plan permits withdrawals before retirement and
there is little likelihood that the funds will actually be used for
the debtor's support, the court should consider these facts in de-
termining whether the funds are reasonably necessary for
support.
3. Benefits reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor- Section 522(d)(10)(E) limits the exemption for pay-
ments under a retirement plan to the extent "reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor. 23 9 Neither the Code nor the legislative history4 0 defines
this phrase;24 1 the courts have defined it on a case-by-case
236. See supra note 220. The reference to I.R.C. § 408 is the authorization for IRAs
and IRANs.
237. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
238. See In re Worthington, 28 Bankr. 736, 739 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (interpreting
a Kentucky exemption analogous to § 522(d)(10)(E)).
239. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982).
240. The legislative history gives a general description of the purpose of the Code's
exemptions:
The historical purpose of. . . exemption laws has been to protect a debtor from
his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his
creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left desti-
tute and a public charge. [This] purpose has not changed ....
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
at 5963, 6087; see also supra note 218.
The "reasonably necessary for support" limitation in § 522(d)(10)(E) was apparently
included because corporate executives and those in professional corporations might ac-
crue huge pension benefits, amounting to several hundred thousand dollars. See Plumb,
supra note 211, at 59.
241. The exemptions listed in § 522(d) were derived in large part from the Uniform
Exemptions Act. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 361, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6317. Section 6(b) of the Uniform Exemptions Act defined
the phrase "property to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of [the debtor]
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basis.2 4 2
The courts have generally agreed that they must consider both
the needs of the debtor at the time of the filing of the petition
and his anticipated future needs.243 It is not, however, appropri-
ate to consider all possible future contingencies that might befall
the debtor.244
A number of factors affect whether a retirement plan is rea-
sonably necessary for the support of the debtor.245 These in-
clude: the debtor's age, health, other sources of income, ability
to reestablish a retirement fund, and whether the debtor is pres-
ently receiving disbursements from the plan.
2 4
6
and his dependents" to mean: "property required to meet the present and anticipated
needs of the individual and his dependents as determined by the court after considera-
tion of the individual's responsibilities and all the present and anticipated property and
income of the individual including that which is exempt." Uniform Exemptions Act
§ 6(b), 13 U.L.A. 365, 382 (1980). The Comment to section 6(b) states:
[Tihe definition requires the court to direct its attention to the individual's
needs and responsibilities, including particularly those that may be attributable
to the disability, illness, or injury on the basis of which benefits became payable,
foreseeable responsibilities for dependents, and the need for providing subsis-
tence for an individual who has reached a mandatory retirement age.
Id. at 384.
242. See, e.g., Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr. 101, 106 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
243. See In re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Rosen, 52 Bankr. 96,
98 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (interpreting Minnesota provision identical to
§ 522(d)(10)(E)); In re Grant, 40 Bankr. 612, 613 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Sheri-
dan, 38 Bankr. 52, 57 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); In re Kenneth Miller, 33 Bankr. 549, 552
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); supra note 241.
244. See In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (court rejecting
argument by 44-year-old debtor in good health that in the event of his death or disability
he would be unable to provide for his children's education without his retirement fund),
aff'd, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984).
245. In Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981), the court
stated the standard that has received general acceptance by the bankruptcy courts:
[T]he reasonably necessary standard requires that the court take into account
other income and exempt property of the debtor, present and anticipated, . ..
and that the appropriate amount to be set aside for the debtor ought to be suffi-
cient to sustain basic needs, not related to his former status in society or the
lifestyle to which he is accustomed but taking into account the special needs
that a retired and elderly debtor may claim.
Id. at 107.
246. The decision on whether a retirement benefit is reasonably necessary for support
is highly fact-specific. In the following cases, the courts mentioned certain important
factors: In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 31 Bankr. 139 (W.D.
Wis. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984) (relatively young debtor, age 44; good
health; income exceeds expenses; retirement fund could easily be reestablished within a
few years; debtor is not presently receiving disbursements from the fund; held that none
cf the $127,400 in retirement fund is reasonably necessary for support); In re Rosen, 52
Bankr. 96 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (elderly debtor, age 69; unemployed; poor physical
health; held that $25,000 in Keogh account is reasonably necessary for support under
Minnesota statute identical to § 522(d)(10)(E)); In re Bari, 43 Bankr. 253 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984) (middle-aged debtor, age 50; disabled; future-earning capacity is uncertain;
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CONCLUSION
The status of a debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan
when the debtor files a petition for individual bankruptcy has
caused a great deal of confusion among the courts. This confu-
sion is caused in part by the complex relationship among the
Bankruptcy Code, ERISA, and the state law of creditors' rights.
It is compounded by the myriad variations of ERISA plans.
This Article has developed a framework for examining the ex-
clusion and exemption of ERISA retirement plans. ERISA plans
should be excluded from the property of the estate only to the
extent that they are enforceable against creditors under state
spendthrift trust law. Whether a plan may be characterized as
an enforceable spendthrift trust will depend upon state law and
the type of plan and plan provisions involved.
If the debtor's interest in an ERISA retirement plan is in-
cluded in the property of the estate, it may nevertheless be ex-
empt. The state and federal non-Code exemption scheme per-
mits a debtor to exempt from the property of the estate, among
other things, property exempt under "federal nonbankruptcy
law." Congress, by the use of the term "federal nonbankruptcy
law," did not intend to include ERISA. A debtor claiming under
the state and federal non-Code exemptions must therefore use
the state law exemptions for ERISA retirement plans.
The federal Code exemption scheme permits a debtor to ex-
held that only $2600 of his $3100 a month disability payment is reasonably necessary for
support); In re Grant, 40 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (one-income family; held
that all $6000 in retirement and profit-sharing plans is reasonably necessary for support);
In re Sheridan, 38 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983) (middle-aged debtor; other sources of
income are modest; held that all $18,000 in retirement fund are reasonably necessary for
support); In re Robert Miller, 36 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984) (interpreting analo-
gous § 522(d)(11)(E)) (debtor is disabled; only assets are homestead, van, and vacant lot;
only source of income (social security disability) pays $100 a month less than expenses;
held that vacant lot valued at $27,000 is reasonably necessary for support); In re John-
son, 36 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984) (middle-aged debtor, age 47; unemployed; travel
expenses to look for new employment; held that all of $12,000 in stock bonus plan is
reasonably necessary for support); In re Kenneth Miller, 33 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1983) (relatively young debtor, age 54; held that $353 a month in future retirement bene-
fits is reasonably necessary for support); In re Werner, 31 Bankr. 418 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1983) (relatively young debtor, age 48; good health; other sources of income sufficient;
not presently receiving disbursements; held that none of $23,700 in retirement fund is
reasonably necessary for support); In re Donaghy, 11 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(elderly debtors, ages 62 and 64; both debtors in very poor health; large medical ex-
penses; held that all of $22,000 lump-sum pension disbursement is reasonably necessary
for support); Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (total
annual income of $37,000; exempt assets worth $8,000; held that half of debtor's $14,000
a year pension payment is not reasonably necessary for support).
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empt from the property of the estate, among other things, his
right to receive a payment from an ERISA retirement plan, to
the extent reasonably necessary for support. Interpretations of
this exemption that would allow a debtor to claim the exemption
only if his benefit is in pay status, or if he has no right to with-
draw plan funds prior to retirement, are unnecessarily strict.
The flexible "reasonable necessary for support" limitation per-
mits courts to grant the exemption when the circumstances
require.
I
